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The Good and Bad News About Consent Searches in the
Supreme Court
Tracey Maclin*
1. INTRODUCTION

I suspect that many law students (and quite a few lawyers) find the Supreme
Court's consent search doctrine both straightforward and bewildering at the same
time. The easy part is that the Court has stated that consent searches are
permissible when a person "voluntarily" consents to the search. And whether a
person's consent is voluntary simply depends on all of the facts of the case. Thus,
when judging whether police properly obtained a person's consent to search, law
students need not learn any multi-prong or multi-factored balancing tests. Nor,
when examining a consent search scenario, must law students consider whether
the police had probable cause or reasonable suspicion for their actions. Consent
searches can go forward with no evidence of criminality. A hunch will do. And
an officer's reason for requesting consent-whether it be motivated by bias, or
because he or she wanted to practice his or her technique at obtaining consent
from motorists or bus passengers--does not undermine the validity of any
consent given by a person.
Similarly, law students need not worry that they have forgotten (or never
learned) what the Framers thought about consent searches. I am sure that many
law students are quite grateful that consent search cases have not triggered the
Justices' new-found concern that their holdings in Fourth Amendment cases be
consistent with the Framers' thinking about the amendment. Although the
Court's most recent consent search case, Georgia v. Randolph,' prompted a little
spat between Justices Stevens and Scalia over how the Framers would have
settled the dispute in that case,2 none of the other Justices showed any inclination
to seek out the Framers' views on consent searches. Furthermore, prior to
Randolph, none of the Justices, including Justices Scalia and Thomas, the Court's
strongest supporters of originalism in constitutional decision-making, have
suggested that history matters when deciding whether a challenged consent
search violates the Fourth Amendment.
On the other hand, there is a surreal quality about the Court's consent search
jurisprudence.' Professor Marcy Strauss nicely summarized the reaction of her

* Joseph Lipsitt Faculty Research Scholar and Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. This
article is the revised and expanded version of the Distinguished Speaker Series lecture that I gave at University
of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law on March 13, 2007. I want to thank Jill Hamers and Nicole Murray for
their research assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. 547 U.S. 103 (2006).
dissenting).
2. See id. at 123-25 (Stevens, J. concurring); id. at 142-45 (Scalia, J.,
3. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Souter nicely described this phenomenon when he stated there was "an
air of unreality about the Court's explanation that bus passengers consent to searches of their luggage to
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law students after reading a typical consent search case: "Every year, I witness
the same mass incredulity. Why, one hundred criminal procedure students jointly
wonder, would someone 'voluntarily' consent to allow a police officer to search
the trunk of his car, knowing that massive amounts of cocaine are easily visible
there?, 4 I imagine that many law students indeed find it "absurd" that a person
"voluntarily consented to a search when surrounded by police at close quarters,
especially if the defendants knew (as they must have) that giving the consent
would ultimately result in serious criminal charges being filed against them."5
Furthermore, law students understand what everyone else knows: a police
"request" to search a bag or automobile is understood by most persons as a
"command." As the late H. Richard Uviller has described, a police request for
consent, "however gently phrased, is likely to be taken by even the toughest
citizen as a command. Refusal of requested 'permission' is thought by most of us
to risk unpleasant, though unknown, consequences. 6 A majority of the Justices
on the Supreme Court, however, reject this reality and continue to decide cases
with the view that people have a genuine choice when police request consent to
search.

'enhanc[e] their own safety and the safety of those around them."' United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 208
(2002) (Souter, J., dissenting).
4. Marcy Strauss, Reconstructing Consent, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 211, 211 (2001).
5. Ric Simmons, Not "Voluntary" but Still Reasonable: A New Paradigm for Understanding the
Consent Searches Doctrine, 80 IND. L.J. 773, 774 (2005). Cf. John M. Burkoff, Search Me?, 39 TEX. TECH L.
REV. 1109, 1114 (2007) ("How much of an idiot-how stupid, moronic, imbecilic-would a person carrying a
gram of crack cocaine stashed in her underwear, for example, have to be to really consent-'freely and
voluntarily'-to being searched by a police officer, knowing full well that such a search would result inevitably
in the discovery of the cocaine and a subsequent arrest?"); Daniel R. Williams, MisplacedAngst: Another Look
at Consent-Search Jurisprudence, 82 IND. L.J. 69, 89 (2007) ("After all, what maddens us about the
voluntariness locution in consent-search cases is precisely the unreality of it-most anyone would feel coerced
by the sorts of police encounters that are described everyday in our courthouses."); Christo Lassiter, Eliminating
Consentfrom the Lexicon of Traffic Stop Interrogations,27 CAP. U. L. REV. 79, 128 (1998) ("It is inherently
improbable that criminal suspects voluntarily would consent to the discovery of the very evidence necessary to
seal their legal demise.").
6. H. RICHARD UVILLER, TEMPERED ZEAL 81 (1988). Professor Uviller was echoing what Professor
Caleb Foote had recognized many years ago, namely, that "what on their face are merely words of request take
on color from the officer's uniform, badge, gun and demeanor." Caleb Foote, The FourthAmendment: Obstacle
or Necessity in the Law of Arrest?, 51 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POL. SCI. 402, 403 (1960). More recently,
Illya Lichtenberg has reached similar conclusions regarding a police "request" for a consent search. According
to Lichtenberg, "there tends to be agreement among most social scientists that when a police officer gives an
order, command, or makes a request he expects compliance." See Illya D. Lichtenberg, Voluntary Consent or
Obedience to Authority: An Inquiry Into the "Consensual" Police-Citizen Encounter 124 (Oct. 1999) (Ph.D.
dissertation, Rutgers University) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). Lichtenberg also believes that:
[C]ertain inferences about police expectations from citizens, and citizen expectations from police are
reasonable. First, a request for consent to search cannot be significantly different from other police
requests. An asymmetrical power relationship in the police-citizen encounter appears to exist. Police
officers have all the power and may not hesitate to use coercive means, whether implied or explicit,
to maintain this assymetrical power relationship. A refusal to consent to a search is a clear challenge
to the officer and the officer may exert his power to achieve compliance. If the policeman did not
want to search, why would he have asked?
Id. at 137-38.
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Another bewildering aspect of the law of consent searches is exactly where
such searches belong in the Court's Fourth Amendment framework. "The precise
basis for the consent doctrine has never been made explicit, and thus there is
some dispute whether the consent doctrine is actually an exception to the warrant
requirement."' Judges and academic commentators have proffered at least three
different doctrinal foundations for consent searches.8 Traditionally, consent
searches have been seen as an exception to the warrant and probable cause
requirements. This is the approach taken in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, the
Court's seminal consent search case. 9 A second theory contends that a consent
search, technically speaking, is not a "search" under the Fourth Amendment
because the subject has relinquished his or her right to be protected by the
amendment. Justice Thurgood Marshall appeared to endorse this view when he
noted that "consent searches are permitted, not because such an exception to the
requirements of probable cause and warrant is essential to proper law
enforcement, but because we permit our citizens to choose whether or not they
wish to exercise their constitutional rights."' Finally, a third view adopts the
position that whether a challenged consent search is valid depends on whether the
police conduct is "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment. Justice Scalia
adopted this view in his opinion for the Court in Illinois v. Rodriguez, a thirdparty consent search case." And this is also the position taken in United States v.

see also Thomas Y. Davies, Denying a Right by Disregarding
7. Strauss, supra note 4, at 216 n. 11;
Doctrine: How Illinois v. Rodriguez Demeans Consent, Trivializes Fourth Amendment Reasonableness, and
Exaggerates the Excusability of Police Error, 59 TENN. L. REV. 1, 26 (1991) ("A number of early Supreme
Court decisions treated consent intrusions as constitutional without explicitly spelling out a theory of consent.").
8. See Strauss, supra note 4, at 216 n. 11 (listing three theories explaining the doctrinal basis for consent
searches); see also George C. Thomas III, Terrorism, Race and a New Approach to Consent Searches, 73 Miss.
L.J. 525, 544 (2003) (noting that the Court has offered the "waiver" and "reasonableness" theories, but "has
settled on [reasonableness as the] justification for the consent search doctrine").
9. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) ("It is ... well settled that one of the
specifically established exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is a search that is
conducted pursuant to consent." (citing Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 593-94 (1946); Zap v. United
States, 328 U.S. 624, 630 (1946))). Interestingly, at the Court's conference discussing Bustamonte, Justice
Stewart, the author of Bustamonte, took the position that "[i]f there is consent, the Fourth Amendment does not
apply at all." THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE (1940-1985), at 456 (Del Dickson ed., 2001). Prior to
Bustamonte, the Court's early consent cases, including Davis, simply assumed that consent searches were valid
and did not identify a doctrinal basis for consent searches. See infra notes 52-71 and accompanying text.
10. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 283 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Davies, supra note 7, at 28.
According to Professor Thomas Davies,
[C]onsent amounts to a citizen's surrender of an expectation of privacy and an exposure of an
otherwise private interest. Under this concept, the sole focus of inquiry is whether a person whose
privacy interest was at stake (a person with authority over the premises) actually gave permission for
an intrusion. If such a person gave consent, the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard is
rendered inapplicable. If no such person gave consent, the protections of the Fourth Amendment
apply in full.
Id. at 28 (footnotes omitted).
11. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 183 (1990) ("What [the defendant] is assured by the Fourth
Amendment itself, however, is not that no government search of his house will occur unless he consents; but
that no such search will occur that is 'unreasonable."'); see also id. at 187 ("[W]hat is at issue when a claim of
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Drayton, which held that bus passengers need not be informed of their right to
refuse cooperation when police seek permission to search their bodies or
luggage."

While courts and scholars have divergent views on the doctrinal basis for
consent searches, there is no disagreement that police prefer consent searches to
other types of investigative techniques. In fact, as Professors Joshua Dressler and
Alan Michaels tell us in their popular treatise on criminal procedure, consent
searches "are a dominant-perhaps the dominant-type of lawful warrantless
search."' 3 And many law professors share their view that "there are few areas of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence of greater practical significance than consent
searches."'' 4 But the police penchant to rely on consent searches raises another
problem: the tension between, on the one hand, the police preference for and the
Court's zeal to approve consent searches, 5 and, on the other hand, the Court's
commitment to the so-called warrant requirement.

apparent consent is raised is not whether the right to be free of searches has been waived, but whether the right
to be free of unreasonable searches has been violated."). In Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006), like
Rodriguez, another third-party consent case, Chief Justice Roberts seemed to endorse both the second and third
doctrinal basis for consent searches. He stated that a "warrantless search is reasonable if police obtain the
voluntary consent of a person authorized to give it. Co-occupants have 'assumed the risk that one of their
number might permit [a] common area to be searched."' Id. at 128 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see also id. at 137
("[Tihe more reasonable approach is to adopt a rule acknowledging that shared living space entails a limited
yielding of privacy to others, and that the law historically permits those to whom we have yielded our privacy to
in turn cooperate with the government. Such a rule flows more naturally from our cases concerning Fourth
Amendment reasonableness and is logically grounded in the concept of privacy underlying that Amendment.").
12. United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 206-07 (2002). In an interesting and provocative article,
Professor Daniel Williams contends that "reasonableness" has been the focus of the Court's analysis in consent
cases since at least Bustamonte. Williams, supra note 5. Williams argues that despite statements to the contrary
in its opinion, the Bustamonte Court never "actually embraced" the concept of voluntariness. See id. at 92-93.
Metaphysical notions like voluntariness have always been mere lexical paraphernalia of the actual
inquiry into police methods we accept as legitimate crime-fighting tools. What happened in
Bustamonte and all of the other consent-search cases is what happened in Rodriguez: the Court
evaluated a civilian-police encounter and inquired into whether the crime-fighting methodology was
minimally acceptable. The Court might dress up the analysis with evocative metaphysical notions,
but only naivet6 or the desire to erect a straw-man critique prevents one from seeing that the Court
purports to do nothing more, and nothing less, than assess reasonableness.
Id. (footnote omitted).
13.

1 JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

§

16.01, at

261 (4th ed. 2006). Cf. Simmons, supra note 5, at 773 ("Over 90% of warrantless police searches are
accomplished through the use of the consent exception to the Fourth Amendment."); Burkoff, supra note 5, at
1121 (noting that police are "quite open about" their willingness to pursue consent as a means of executing
suspicionless searches).
14.
DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 13, § 16.01, at 261; see, e.g., Strauss, supra note 4, at 214;
Janice Nadler, No Need to Shout: Bus Sweeps and the Psychology of Coercion, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 153, 209-10
& n. 193.
15. Professor Wayne LaFave understates the Court's attitude toward consent searches when he notes
that "[tihe practice of making searches by consent is not a disfavored one." 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 8.1, at 5 (4th ed. 2004). Similarly, Professor Janice
Nadler has commented that the Court's attitude "appears to be that consent searches ought to be encouraged (or
at least not discouraged) because they reinforce the rule of law." Nadler, supra note 14, at 210; see also Morgan
Cloud, Ignorance and Democracy, 39 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1143, 1143 (2007) ("[Clontemporary Fourth
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It is an understatement to say that law enforcement officials highly favor
consent searches. A non-exhaustive list of the reasons for this preference would
include the fact that consent searches are easy. 6 In most jurisdictions, a request
for consent need not be based upon any suspicion of criminal conduct. Also,
consent searches do not entail the administrative hassles, time, and risks
associated with obtaining and executing a judicial warrant. From a strategic
standpoint, police view consent searches "as the 'safest' course of action in terms
of minimizing the risk" of having criminal evidence excluded at a suppression

hearing. 7 Furthermore, a consent search may provide the police authority and
discretion to conduct an open-ended search with virtually no limits. As Professor
Wayne LaFave explains, a consent search has the "added benefit, at least when
the consenting party does not carefully condition or qualify his consent, that the
search pursuant to consent may often be of a somewhat broader scope than would
be possible under a search warrant.'. 8 Finally, consent searches are popular
because they allow police to exercise their discretion and power in contexts that
affect literally hundreds of thousands of persons where the target is unlikely to
say "no" to a request for a consent search. The fact that most persons subjected to
consent searches are innocent of criminal conduct is constitutionally irrelevant.' 9
This aspect of consent searches is most pronounced when police request consent
Amendment doctrine governing consent searches accepts-even encourages-ignorance among the people
about their constitutional rights.").
16. See, e.g., RICHARD VAN DUIZEND, L. PAUL SUTrON & CHARLOT-rE A. CARTER, THE SEARCH
WARRANT PROCESS 68-69 (1984) ("[L]istening to some law enforcement officers would lead to the conclusion
that consent is the easiest thing in the world to obtain."); see cf id. at 19 (quoting a police detective saying:
"'Actually, there are a lot of warrants that are not sought because of the hassle.... I don't think you can forgo a
case because of the hassle of a search warrant, but you can ... work some other method. If I can get consent [to
search], I'm gonna do it."' This detective suggested that as many as 98 percent of the searches were by
consent.).
17. LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 8.1, at 4-5; see also Strauss, supra note 4, at 259 ("[Elven if the police
have probable cause to search, and even if procuring a warrant would not be onerous, an officer may elect to
obtain consent because it increases the likelihood that the search would be deemed valid."). Cf. LAWRENCE P.
TIFFANY, DONALD M. MCINTYRE, JR. & DANIEL L. ROTENBERG, DETECTION OF CRIME 159 (1967) ("In the
routine case, police are likely to rely on the consent search to save the time and avoid the difficulty involved in
going through the rather elaborate procedure required to obtain a search warrant.").
18.

LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 8.1, at 5.

19. Cf. Strauss, supra note 4, at 214 ("Although precise figures detailing the number of searches
conducted pursuant to consent are not-and probably can never be-available, there is no dispute that these
type of searches affect tens of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, of people every year. And recent
decisions by the Supreme Court endorsing suspicionless drug interdictions and pretextual automobile stops will
only magnify the problem." (footnotes omitted)); Nadler, supra note 14, at 209 ("[T]he small amount of
scattered evidence that exists suggests that the absolute number of consent searches is quite high, as is the
proportion of consent searches of all searches conducted."). Professor Nadler also notes that "[t]he vast majority
of people subjected to consent searches are innocent." Id. at 210. A recently released federal study, based on
interviews conducted by the Census Bureau of persons who had contact with the police, found that "[mIore than
half (57.6%) of all searches conducted [by the police during traffic stops] in 2005 were by consent." MATTHEW
R. DUROSE, ERICA L. SMITH & PATRICK A. LANGAN, U.S. DEP'T JUST., CONTACTS BETWEEN POLICE AND THE
PUBLIC, 2005, at 6 (2007), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cpp05.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review). The study found that in "11.6% of searches conducted during a traffic stop in 2005, police found
drugs, an illegal weapon, open containers of alcohol, or other illegal items." Id. at 7.
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from motorists during routine traffic stops or from passengers traveling on
interstate buses and trains. 20 Motorists stopped for traffic offenses and passengers

on interstate buses and trains are the classic examples of a "captured audience."
The last reason explaining why police prefer consent searches highlights the
tension between consent searches and the warrant requirement. The warrant
requirement was designed primarily to interpose a neutral magistrate's judgment
between the law enforcement officer zealously ferreting out crime and the
privacy and personal security of individual citizens. 2' During the heyday of the
warrant requirement, the Court repeatedly insisted "that searches conducted
outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are
per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.",,2 To be sure, even the
Warren Court, and later the Burger Court, was willing to recognize that consent
searches were an exception to the warrant requirement. But the justifications
announced for consent searches in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte23 were neither
convincing nor compelling. Moreover, those justifications undermine the
rationale behind the warrant requirement.
Justice Stewart's opinion for the Court in Bustamonte ruled that police must
be permitted to pursue consent searches, even without informing a person of his
right to refuse a consent search and without any showing that the person had
knowledge of his right to deny consent.24 The Court insisted that there was a
"legitimate [societal] need for [consent] searches" and that in certain cases a
consent search "may be the only means of obtaining important and reliable
evidence."25 Justice Stewart's premise that society has a legitimate need for
consent searches-while holding "at least surface appeal" 26-- certainly proves
very little for Fourth Amendment purposes. As Stewart recognized in many other
search and seizure cases:
[T]he mere fact that law enforcement may be made more efficient can
never by itself justify disregard of the Fourth Amendment. The
investigation of crime would always be simplified if warrants were
unnecessary. But the Fourth Amendment reflects the view of those who
wrote the Bill of Rights that the privacy of a person's home and property
20.

Nadler, supra note 14, at 209-10 & n.193 ("There is no reliable estimate for the number of consent

searches conducted in any given year nationwide (or even statewide). In some cases, police officers have
testified that they ask for consent to search every motorist they stop. In one city, it was estimated anecdotally
that 98% of the searches were consent searches." (citations omitted)).
21.

See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452,

464 (1932).

22.

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (footnote omitted).

23.

412 U.S. 218 (1973).

24. Id. at 227-34, 248-49.
25. Id. at 227.
26. Strauss, supra note 4, at 260 ("[Elven in the absence of empirical evidence, the argument [that law
enforcement interests are advanced by consent searches] holds at least surface appeal.").
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may not be totally sacrificed in the name of maximum simplicity in
enforcement of the criminal law.27
Justice Stewart's related concern, that in certain cases a consent search may
be the "only" means to obtain criminal evidence, was a naked assumption
without empirical support.2 ' Today, there is anecdotal as well as empirical
evidence suggesting that consent searches are not particularly effective, 29 and as a
political matter, the popularity of consent searches seems to be declining. 0

27. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978) (citation omitted).
28. See Daniel L. Rotenberg, An Essay On Consent(less) Police Searches, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 175, 190
(1991) (criticizing Justice Stewart's analysis on this point and noting that "[a]necdotal evidence and a brief
survey of several police departments suggest that the consent search tactic is used innovatively, extensively,
occasionally, or perhaps not all"); Strauss, supra note 4, at 260-61 (noting that Stewart's arguments supporting
the police need for consent searches have not been "empirically validated" and explaining that "there is strong
reason to believe that crime control would not unduly suffer were the police no longer able to obtain consent to
search."); LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 8.1, at 12 (questioning Justice Stewart's premise that there is a compelling
need for consent searches: "It is to be strongly doubted ... whether this is the case.").
29. For example, a report from the New Jersey Attorney General's Office concluded that "most consent
searches [conducted by state troopers] do not result in a positive finding" of criminal activity, even with a
requirement that there be reasonable suspicion of criminality before requesting permission to search. RONALD
SUSSWEIN ET AL., N.J. OFFICE ATT'Y GEN., INTERIM REPORT OF THE STATE POLICE REVIEW TEAM REGARDING

ALLEGATIONS OF RACIAL PROFILING 28 (1999), http://www.state.nj.us/lps/intm_419.pdf (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review). The report further explained that the "positive" findings disclosed by state police
empirical data concerning consent searches were "somewhat misleading, since a positive result is recorded if
the search led to any arrest or seizure of contraband without considering the seriousness of the charge or the
type, quantity, or value of contraband that was discovered. Based upon anecdotal reports, most arrests are for
less serious offenses, and major seizures of significant drug shipments are correspondingly rare." Id. at 36-37.
Finally, this report also found "that minority motorists were disproportionately subject to consent searches." Id.
at 30. This negative view of consent searches was reaffirmed by Dr. James J. Fyfe, a criminal justice professor
and former New York City police lieutenant. Dr. Fyfe testified to the New Jersey Senate Judiciary Committee
that
consent searches should be ended, because they pose a real threat to Fourth Amendment rights and
because they are not an efficient law enforcement tool. He said consent searches were always
suspect . . . . He said waivers of the Fourth Amendment are valid only when they are made
voluntarily and intelligently, and police managers should be skeptical of police officers who say they
found drugs in a motorist's trunk after they were given consent to search. He believed far more
credible are the accounts of individuals who were subject to consent searches and who said they did
not know they could refuse the search and were told that if they did not consent, they would be
detained while the trooper obtained a warrant[.]
REPORT OF THE NEW JERSEY SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITrEE'S INVESTIGATION OF RACIAL PROFILING AND THE

NEW JERSEY STATE POLICE 79 (2001), http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/RacialProfiling/sjufinal.pdf (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
30. Public opposition to consent searches has typically arisen as part of a political movement against
police racial profiling of motorists. See Note, The Fourth Amendment and Antidilution: Confronting the
Overlooked Function of the Consent Search Doctrine, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2187, 2187-88 (2006) [hereinafter
The Fourth Amendment and Antidilution] ("Hawaii, Minnesota, New Jersey, and Rhode Island banned the use
of consent searches 'after controversies about racial profiling,' and the California Highway Patrol voluntarily
adopted a policy prohibiting its officers from requesting consent searches from motorists." (footnote omitted));
Scott Henson, "Strange Coalition" Backs Consent Search Ban, Apr. 13, 2005, http://gritsforbreakfast.
blogspot.com/2005/04/strange-coalition-backs-consent-search.htm (on file with the McGeorge Law Review)
(describing coalition between the American Civil Liberties Union and the National Rifle Association in
supporting a ban on consent searches in Texas during traffic stops). A group of public interest organizations in
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Concededly, Justice Stewart did not hide the policy choices that motivated his
decision to allow consent searches, and reasonable persons can disagree over his
hardheaded concerns about the need for consent searches. But, as Professors
Dressler and Michaels correctly observe, Justice Stewart's "pragmatic explanation" justifying consent searches, "although candid, is conceptually weak if
there really is a constitutional warrant requirement."'
From the perspective of the individual, a major problem with consent
searches as authorized in Bustamonte is that police are given unfettered discretion to pursue consent without informing an individual of his right to say no
and telling the individual that refusal will be respected by the police. Another
significant problem with consent searches is that in the typical case, where the
police seek consent from a motorist stopped for a traffic violation or from a
passenger sitting on a bus, the confrontation between the police and the citizen is
not an "arm's length" encounter. These factors are relevant to Fourth
Amendment analysis because the amendment is concerned with checking police
discretionary power. The Court once explained that "[siecurity against unlawful
searches is more likely to be attained by resort to search warrants than by reliance
upon the caution and sagacity of petty officers while acting under the excitement
that attends the capture of persons accused of crime. 3 2 If that statement remains
accurate, consent searches, as currently executed by most police officers, threaten
the security protected by the Fourth Amendment. If, as the Court has said on
numerous occasions, the purpose of the Fourth Amendment and the warrant
requirement is to establish a judicial framework, rather than an officer-in-thefield process, for deciding "[w]hen the right of privacy must reasonably yield to
the right of search,"33 then consent searches, as currently practiced in much of the

nation, seem at odds with the purpose of the warrant requirement.
Texas subsequently produced reports calling for a ban on consent searches during traffic stops. See, e.g.,
DWIGHT STEWARD & MOLLY TOTMAN, DON'T MIND IF I TAKE A LOOK, DO YA?: AN EXAMINATION OF
CONSENT SEARCHES AND CONTRABAND HIT RATES AT TEXAS TRAFFIC STOPS (2005), http://www.criminal
justicecoalition.org/files/userfiles/racial-profiling/racial-profiling- report_2005.pdf (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review). The report, relying on statistics generated by Texas law enforcement agencies, found that "2 out
of 3 law enforcement agencies reported consent searching Blacks or Latinos at higher rates than Anglos
following a traffic stop" and that the "contraband hit rates from consent searches does not indicate that these
searches are proving fruitful," suggesting that "consent searches not only yield high racial disparities, but that
they are likely an ineffective and inefficient use of law enforcement resources." Id. at 7.

31.

DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 13, § 16.01, at 262.

32. United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932).
33. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) ("When the right of privacy must
reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or
government enforcement agent."). As Justice Douglas has explained, authorizing police to proceed with consent
searches "circumvent[s]" the warrant requirement in three ways:
First, [police] avoid submitting to a magistrate's independent assessment of probable cause. Second,
[police] are spared the necessity of making a record, in the form of an affidavit sworn prior to the
search, that guards against the possibility that an ex post facto justification will be based upon what
the search turns up. Finally, to the extent the police use.., a boilerplate consent form, they are
relieved of the particularity requirement of the warrant.
Gentile v. United States, 419 U.S. 979, 982 (1974) (memorandum disposition denying certiorari) (Douglas, J.,
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Section II of this article describes how the law of consent searches developed
before Bustamonte was decided. Section III focuses on Bustamonte. Specifically,
this section analyzes the emergence of Bustamonte's "voluntariness" test for
judging the validity of consent searches, highlights the spoken and unspoken
premises that influenced the result in Bustamonte, and outlines Bustamonte's
continuing relevance in the Burger and Rehnquist Courts. Section IV of the
article examines United States v. Drayton and explains why a cryptic passage in
that opinion provides important clues on the Court's current understanding of
consent under the Fourth Amendment. Section V discusses Georgia v. Randolph
and the "good" news about consent searches-both explicit and implicitinherent in the majority opinion. Finally, Section VI comments on how the tacit
concerns that explain the result in Randolph can be applied in future consent
search cases.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE LAW OF CONSENT SEARCHES
34
As I hope to demonstrate, the Court's recent ruling in Georgia v. Randolph
may signal an important change in the Court's consent search jurisprudence and
has the potential to alter the way the Justices approach future consent search
cases. To be sure, it will be possible to confine Randolph-a case involving
third-party consent-to its unique facts in future cases. Thus, one can be
understandably skeptical about Randolph's potential to revise the Court's view of
consent in traffic stop or bus interdiction cases. But Bustamonte itself shows that
consent search cases are not decided in a doctrinal vacuum. Bustamonte rejected
a "waiver" model for measuring the validity of a consent search in the traffic stop
context, in part, because such an approach was "thoroughly inconsistent" with
the Court's earlier decisions approving third-party consent searches in very
different contexts.35 Thus, while the facts of third-party consent cases and traffic
stop consent cases often differ dramatically, doctrinal concerns in one category of
cases can sometimes affect another category of cases.36 But before explaining
why Randolph may signal a change in the way the Court approaches consent
searches, it is important to understand how the law of consent searches has
evolved to its current status.

dissenting).
34. 547 U.S. 103 (2006).
35. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 245-46 (1973).
36. Williams, supra note 5, at 73 n.16 ("Although third-party consent-search cases are relatively rare,
they are doctrinally significant because of how their existence shapes the consent-search analysis."). Cf. Peter
Goldberger, Consent, Expectations of Privacy, and the Meaning of "Searches" in the FourthAmendment, 75 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 319, 326 (1984) (noting the overlap in the Court's Fourth Amendment cases where
"the concept of expectation of privacy-and its constitutent [sic] element assumption of risk-may be used in
one case to determine whether a search occurred, and in another case to determine whether there was consent").
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A. Early Explanations of Why Consent Searches are Reasonable

The Court's initial explanations reconciling consent searches with the Fourth
Amendment were tentative and, at times, murky.3 Indeed, in Amos v. United
States," which is sometimes cited as one of the Court's first cases raising issues
of consent under the Fourth Amendment,39 the Court never used the term
"consent" in its opinion. In Amos, federal officers arrived at the home of the
defendant where they were met by his wife.40 They informed the wife that they
were federal officers and had come to search the premises for violations of the
revenue laws. 4 ' The officers had no warrant.42 The wife provided the officers
access to the home and a "store" that was located within the curtilage of the
home. 43 The search revealed illegal whiskey. 44
The Court held that the search violated Amos' Fourth Amendment rights
because the officers lacked a warrant.45 Apart from any issue of consent, the
Court ruled that the failure to obtain a warrant made the search unreasonable.46 In
one short paragraph, the Court summarily rejected the government's contention

37. Cf. Davies, supra note 7, at 26 (noting that early Court rulings did not expressly spell out a theory of
consent and that some "pre-Burger Court decisions that did explain consent typically described it as a waiver").
38. 255U.S.313(1921).
39. See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 8, at 545 (noting that the Court's first rulings regarding consent
searches "assumed that waiver" was the proper standard for measuring consent and citing to Amos as "the
earliest of the Court's Fourth Amendment cases raising 'consent'). Amos was decided on the same day that the
Court decided Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921). In Gouled, a government informant, who was a
friend of Gouled, went to Gouled's office to gather information about an alleged conspiracy to defraud the
government. Id. at 304. The informant, "pretending to make a friendly call," obtained admission to Gouled's
office and "in [Gouled's] absence, without warrant of any character, seized and carried away several
documents," one of which was later admitted at Gouled's prosecution for fraud. Id. The Court upheld Gouled's
Fourth Amendment claim. See id. at 305-06. Although the government argued that Gouled had consented to the
informant's entry, the Court did not address that issue. Instead, the Court focused on the "search and seizure
subsequently and secretly made in [Gouled's] absence." Id. at 306. For a more detailed explanation on Gouled
.and its impact on covert intrusions by government informants and spies, see Tracey Maclin, Informants and the
Fourth Amendment, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 573 (1996).
40. Amos, 255 U.S. at 315.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 314-15.
44. Id. at 315.
45. Id. at 315-17.
46. Id. at 315-16. The Court explained that its holding in Gouled dictated this result. Id. at 316. Gouled
ruled that warrantless searches were unreasonable. See Gouled, 255 U.S. at 308 ("Searches and seizures are as
constitutional under the Amendment when made under valid search warrants as they are unconstitutional,
because unreasonable, when made without them,-the permission of the Amendment has the same
constitutional warrant as the prohibition has, and the definition of the former restrains the scope of the latter.");
see also Morgan Cloud, The Fourth Amendment During the Lochner Era: Privacy, Property, and Liberty in
Constitutional Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 555, 592 (1996) (explaining that Gouled required, as a threshold
matter, that a search or seizure of a home or office satisfy the procedural safeguards contained in the Warrant
Clause: "Searches and seizures conducted pursuant to warrants satisfying the requirements of probable cause,
particularity, and an oath, were defined as not unreasonable, and therefore not unconstitutional. The absence of
a valid warrant, however, meant that a search or seizure was both unreasonable and unconstitutional.").
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that Amos' rights had been "waived" when his wife gave the agents access to the
home.47 While the Court left open the question "whether it is possible for a wife,
in the absence of her husband ....

to waive his constitutional rights," there was

no need to address that issue in Amos because it was "perfectly clear that under
the implied coercion here presented, no such waiver was intended or effected. 4 8
The holding in Amos rested on the principle that warrantless searches were
unreasonable searches. The Court's brief response to the government's argument
suggested, but did not definitively determine, that the Court was inclined to view
consent as requiring an intentional waiver of one's right.49 Importantly, however,
Amos followed the principle, dating back to at least 1914 when the Court decided
Weeks v. United States, ° that warrantless searches by government officers
violated the Fourth Amendment. 5'
The Court's next important discussion of consent occurred twenty-five years
after Amos was decided. In 1946, the Court decided Davis v. United States 2 and
planted the seeds for the "voluntariness" test that would eventually be embraced
in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte. Davis was the owner of a gasoline station and was
suspected of dealing in black market gasoline.53 After purchasing gas without the
necessary gasoline ration stamps, federal agents arrested an attendant, and then
arrested Davis when he returned to the station.54 While questioning Davis, the
agents demanded access to a locked room where Davis kept his records.55 Davis,
at first, refused access to the room but eventually relented, according to his
testimony, "because the agents threatened to break down the door if he did not. 56
After Davis opened the door, he gave the agents gasoline coupons that had been
stored in a filing cabinet.57 These coupons were used to convict him at trial.5 8

47. Amos, 255 U.S. at 317.
48. Id.
49. See Thomas, supra note 8, at 545 ("It is impossible to read this paragraph [in Amos] as based on a
theory other than waiver.").
50. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
51. See id. at 393 (stating that federal law enforcement officers "could only have invaded the house of
the accused when armed with a warrant issued as required by the Constitution"); see also Cloud supra note 46,
at 590 (explaining that in the early part of the twentieth century the Court took the view that:
Searches and seizures of property thus were subject to both procedural and substantive limitations.
All intrusions had to satisfy the procedural rules. The substantive restrictions, however, established a
hierarchical order based upon the nature of the property. Private papers sat at the top, immune from
seizure unless they were stolen, contraband, or criminal instrumentalities. Property fitting into one of
those categories lay at the bottom of the substantive hierarchy. Government could seize these items
because it had a recognized property or possessory interest in them. And no matter where property
fell in this pecking order, its physical location was relevant.).
52. 328 U.S. 582 (1946).
53. Id. at 585
54. Id.
55. Id. at 586.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See id. at 587.
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The agents, not surprisingly, offered a different version of the facts. One
agent testified that he told Davis that he would have to open the door to the60
locked room. 9 The agent denied, however, threatening to break open the door.
While questioning continued between Davis and the agents, Davis observed
another agent attempting to gain access to the locked room. 6' According to one of
the agents, Davis then said, "He don't need to do that. I will open the damned
door."62 The district court credited the agents' version of the facts and found that
Davis "had consented to the search and seizure and that his consent was
voluntary.
The Court of Appeals affirmed Davis' conviction but did not
address and expressed some doubt regarding the district court's ruling that Davis'
consent to the search was "voluntary." 64
In an opinion that many today might find startling in light of its author,
Justice Douglas ruled that the agents had not violated Davis' Fourth Amendment
rights. Justice Douglas began by noting that the Court's prior cases defining the
scope of "reasonable" searches and seizures were not controlling because they
dealt with the seizure of private papers.6 The search of Davis' office involved
"gasoline ration coupons which never became the private property of the holder
but remained at all times the property of the Government and subject to
inspection and recall by it." 67 Justice Douglas explained that where government
officers seek to inspect "public documents at the place of business where they are
required to be kept, permissible limits of persuasion are not so narrow as where
private papers are sought."' When someone doing business with the government,
as was Davis, "is persuaded by argument that it is his duty to surrender [public
documents] and he hands them over, duress and coercion will not be so readily

59. Id. at 586.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 586-87.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 587.
64. Id. Specifically, the Court of Appeals observed that "Davis must have known, under arrest as he was,
that the officers were not likely to stand very long upon ceremony, but in one way or another, would enter the
office." United States v. Davis, 151 F.2d 140, 142 (2d Cir. 1945).
65. See id. at 593-94. According to one biographer of Douglas, in 1946, "Douglas was no civil
libertarian" in the view of his fellow Justices. BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, WILD BILL: THE LEGEND AND LIFE OF
WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS 236 (2003).

66. See Davis, 582 U.S. at 587-88.
67. Id. at 588. Justice Douglas relied upon Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911), for the
principle that the Fourth Amendment recognizes a distinction between the seizure of private papers or
documents and public property in the custody of a citizen. Id. at 589. Wilson, however, concerned whether a
corporate officer, who held corporate documents, could resist a subpoena duces tecum issued to a corporation
on the grounds that producing the documents would incriminate him. See id. at 367-71. The Wilson Court
rejected the officer's Fifth Amendment claim. See id. at 377-86. Wilson's discussion of the Fourth Amendment
was limited to explaining that the subpoena "was definite and reasonable in its requirements, and it was not
open to the objection" that it was overbroad or unreasonable in its demand for documents. Id. at 376. There was
no discussion of the concept of consent in Wilson.
68. Davis, 328 U.S. at 593.
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implied as where private papers are involved." 69 Douglas also noted that because
the search and seizure occurred in a business location, rather than a home, "[t]he
strict test of consent, designed to protect an accused against production of
incriminating evidence, has no place here., 70 Ultimately, Justice Douglas
concluded that, "as a matter of law," the district court's finding that Davis
had
7
consented to the search and seizure of the coupons was not "erroneous. 1
Justice Douglas' opinion in Davis is noteworthy on several counts. 72 The
most remarkable aspect of his opinion, however, is its departure from precedent
concerning the reasonableness of warrantless searches of homes and offices.
Davis makes almost no effort to reconcile the concept of consent with the
principle that warrantless searches were unreasonable and at odds with the
underlying of the purposes of the Fourth Amendment. As already noted, during
the early part of the twentieth century, the Court considered warrantless searches
of homes and offices unreasonable searches." By the time that Davis was
decided, the Court and individual Justices had issued several opinions outlining
the purpose behind the amendment. Foremost among those opinions were Weeks
v. United States74 and Justice Brandeis' dissent in Olmstead v. United States,75
which provided a theoretical foundation for a broad construction of the

69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Justice Douglas' opinion should make one pause because of its many omissions. For example, not
only does Douglas not define the meaning of consent, he never explains what he meant by the phrase the "strict
test of consent," id., a standard that he concludes is not applicable to the search of Davis' store. Similarly,
Douglas does not explain why government officers are given greater leeway to use duress and coercion when
seeking public documents. See id. Nor does he explain why consent is a narrower concept when governmental
agents seek consent to search a business, rather than a home. Justice Douglas also does not explain why the
concept of consent under the Fourth Amendment is tied to the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination. See id. ("The custodian in this situation is not protected against the production of incriminating
documents. The strict test of consent, designed to protect an accused against production of incriminating
evidence, has no place here."). As Justice Frankfurter notes in his dissent in Davis, the majority "derives
voluntariness from the fact that what the officers compelled Davis to give up were ration coupons." Id. at 600
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting). As Frankfurter correctly notes, the majority's understanding of voluntariness is at
odds with the common understanding of that term. See id. ("[Tihe law has always meant by 'voluntary' what
everybody else means by it."). Surely, the Court of Appeals had the better argument when they expressed doubt
regarding the district court's finding that Davis had voluntarily consent to the search of the locked room: "Davis
must have known, under arrest as he was, that the officers were not likely to stand very long upon ceremony,
but in one way or another, would enter the office." United States v. Davis, 151 F.2d 140, 142 (2d Cir. 1945).
Finally, Justice Douglas never explains why the legal concept of "voluntariness" in this context turns on "the
nature of the quest, instead of on the nature of the response of the person in control of the sought documents."
Davis, 328 U.S. at 600 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
73. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
74. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). Professor Morgan Cloud has explained that although Weeks is better known
among modern lawyers and scholars as the leading case adopting the exclusionary rule for federal cases, Weeks
also established a significant "building block to the interpretative theory emphasizing the Warrant Clause" as
the touchstone for determining the constitutionality of governmental searches and seizures. Cloud, supra note
46, at 587.
75. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
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amendment as a bulwark against unjustified governmental intrusions. Brandeis
famously noted that the Fourth Amendment conferred a "right to be let alone"
from governmental intrusions upon the "privacy of the individual."76 Brandeis
also noted,
[u]njustified search and seizure violates the Fourth Amendment,
whatever the character of the paper; whether the paper when taken by the
federal officers was in the home, in an office or elsewhere; whether the
taking was effected by force, by fraud, or in the orderly process of a
court's procedure.77
The Court's other opinions preceding Davis also explain why warrantless
searches were inconsistent with the amendment's purpose. In Weeks v. United
States the Court explained that the Fourth Amendment was designed to put law
enforcement officers "under limitations and restraints as to the exercise of [their]
power and authority," especially in light of "[t]he tendency of those who execute
the criminal laws of the country to obtain conviction by means of unlawful
seizures. 7 'To promote this goal, warrantless searches of homes and offices were
disfavored. Accordingly, in United States v. Lefkowitz the Court stated-fourteen
years before Davis was decided-that "the informed and deliberate
determinations of magistrates empowered to issue warrants as to what searches
and seizures are permissible under the Constitution are to be preferred over the
hurried action of officers and others who may happen to make arrests. 79
Justice Douglas' opinion in Davis never explains why consent searches in
general, or the specific search of Davis' office, which Douglas concedes did not
satisfy the "strict test of consent,, 80 were consistent with underlying purpose of
the Fourth Amendment. Nor does Justice Douglas attempt to reconcile his ruling
that the warrantless search of Davis' office was constitutional with the
established principle that warrantless searches of homes and offices are
constitutionally unreasonable.8 ' These omissions are even more troubling after
76. Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
77. Id. at 477-78 (footnotes omitted).
78. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 392.
79. United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932).
80. Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 593 (1946).
81. When Davis was decided, there was no dispute that business offices were protected by the Fourth
Amendment. See, e.g., Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921); Silverthome Lumber Co. v. United States,
251 U.S. 385 (1920); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906) ("[W]e do not wish to be understood as holding
that a corporation is not entitled to immunity, under the Fourth Amendment, against unreasonablesearches and
seizures."); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). In a companion case to Davis, Zap v. United States,
328 U.S. 624 (1946), also authored by Justice Douglas, the Court upheld a warrantless examination of Zap's
business records and a warrantless seizure of a check that was used to convict Zap of defrauding the
government related to a contract with the Navy Department, notwithstanding Zap's protest against this
intrusion. In Zap, Justice Douglas relied on Davis for the proposition that the law of searches and seizures "is
the product of the interplay of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments." Zap, 328 U.S. at 628. He explained that
"those rights may be waived," and that Zap, "in order to obtain the Government's business, specifically agreed
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reading Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Davis. As Frankfurter observed, if the
point of having judges issue warrants is to confine the scope of the subsequent
search, "[i]t cannot be that the Constitution meant to make it legally
advantageous not to have a warrant, so that the police may roam freely and have
the courts retrospectively hold that the search that was made was 'reasonable,'
reasonableness being judged from the point of view of obtaining relevant
intrusion "was
evidence."8'2 Such a discretionary and unsupervised police
83
precisely what the Fourth Amendment was meant to stop.
B. The Rationale of Third-Party Consent Searches
Davis marked the Court's first tentative steps to explain why consent
searches were consistent with the Fourth Amendment. Another important phase
in the development of the law of consent searches is the Court's treatment of
third-party consent searches during the time period between Davis and the
landmark ruling in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte. As was the case in Davis, the
constitutional theory supporting third-party consent searches is not obvious from
the opinions of the Court. 8 While detailed analysis is not forthcoming from the
Court, the Court's silence on one point is significant and revealing. In the thirdparty consent cases, the Court does not announce a per se rule barring third-party
consent searches. Such a rule could have been defended on the basis that such
searches do not involve exigent circumstances excusing the procuring of a
warrant. More importantly, a per se ban on third-party consent searches was
supported by several precedents in the early part of the twentieth century in
which the Court held that warrantless searches of homes and offices were
unreasonable searches. Finally, a prohibition on third-party consent searches
would have been arguably more in line with the Framers' underlying purposes
for the amendment, which was to control discretionary searches by law
enforcement officers. Somewhat ironically, Justice Douglas, the author of Davis,
would subsequently adopt this position notwithstanding his opinion in Davis. But
to permit inspection of his accounts and records, he voluntarily waived such claim to privacy which he
otherwise might have had as respects business documents related to those contracts." Id. While Justice Douglas
conceded Zap's contract with the Navy Department did not authorize the seizure of the check, he nonetheless
found that "[t]hough consent to the inspection did not include consent to the taking of the check, there was no
wrongdoing in the method by which the incriminating evidence was obtained." Id. at 630.
82. Davis, 328 U.S. at 595 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
83. Id.
84. See LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 8.3(a), at 143 ("In the relatively few third party consent cases which
have reached the Court, the theoretical underpinnings of such consent have not been the subject of close or
detailed analysis."). In one of the first cases to address the merits of a third-party consent search, Chapman v.
United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961), Justice Frankfurter remarked that "[tihe course of true law pertaining to
searches and seizures, as enunciated here, has not-to put it mildly-run smooth." Id. at 618 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring). He further noted that the Chapman opinion "is hardly calculated.., to contribute clarification." Id.
Justice Clark's dissent provided stronger criticism. He observed that the Court's search and seizure doctrine
"[ftor some years now ... has been muddy, but today the Court makes it a quagmire." Id. at 622 (Clark, J.,
dissenting).
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by the time that Justice Douglas had come to this view in 1974, the requirements
of the Warrant Clause had ceased to have any application to consent searches.
Chapman v. United States85 was one of the first cases to address the merits of
a third-party consent search. In Chapman, the defendant's landlord told the
police to enter the defendant's home when the landlord and the police detected a
"strong odor of 'whiskey mash' coming from the house. 86 After entering, the
police found "a complete and sizable distillery and 1,300 gallons of mash located
in the living room. ' The government later argued that the landlord's authority
justified the warrantless search, but the Court rejected that claim.8 The Court
emphasized, inter alia, that acceptance of this argument would reduce the Fourth
Amendment "to a nullity" and leave tenants' Fourth Amendment rights "secure
only in the discretion of [landlords]." 9 While Chapman was somewhat vague
about the basis for its holding, perhaps purposefully so, 9° in Stoner v. Calfornia,9"
the Court appeared to provide some clarity regarding third-party consent
searches. Stoner involved a search of the defendant's hotel room after a hotel
desk clerk gave police permission to enter the room and used a hotel key to open
the door for the police.92 The state contended the search was reasonable because it
was conducted with the consent of the hotel clerk. 93 The Court disagreed. 94

85. 365 U.S. 610 (1961).
86. Id. at 612.
87. Id.
88. See id. at 617.
89. Id.
90. In his dissent, Justice Clark emphatically declared that "'Chapman was a tenant no more!' [A
Georgia] statute provided for the forfeiture of his lease at his lessor's option when he began making whiskey on
the premises." Id. at 621 (Clark, J., dissenting). Thus, the search was reasonable, as Georgia law provided the
landlord with a right of entry beyond that of mere discretion. See id. at 620-21. Justice Clark also found the
police officers' decision to forego a warrant reasonable because they would be unable to procure a warrant on
Sunday, and the court record showed "complete reliance by the officers on [the landlord's] direction to enter the
house." Id. at 622. According to Justice Clark, "[i]t is the duty of this Court to lay down those rules with such
clarity and understanding that [the police] may be able to follow them. For some years now the field has been
muddy, but today the Court makes it a quagmire ....
It is disastrous to law enforcement to leave at large the
inconsistent rules laid down in these cases." Id. at 622-23. As Professor LaFave observes, "Chapman tells us
little about what the theoretical basis of third party consent is." LAFAVE, supra, note 15, § 8.3(a), at 144.
Moreover, the lack of clarity in Chapman may have stemmed from the debate among the Justices regarding the
warrant requirement. Compare Chapman, 365 U.S. at 618-19 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (joining the Court's
judgment on the basis that the "reasonableness" of a search turns in large measure on whether a judicial warrant
authorized the search), with id. at 619-623 (Clark, J., dissenting) (Fourth Amendment only bars "unreasonable"
searches, and the police reliance on the landlord's authorization to enter Chapman's home was a reasonable
basis for the search).
91. 376 U.S. 483 (1964).
92. See id. at 485.
93. Id. at 487-88.
94. Id. at 488.
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Justice Stewart's analysis in Stoner is still the subject of debate. 9 He stated
that there was no substance to the state's claim that the police had a reasonable
basis for believing that the hotel clerk had the authority to consent to the search
of Stoner's room.96 There was no substance to this claim because the Court's
rulings "make clear that the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment are not to
be eroded by strained applications of the law of agency or unrealistic doctrines of
'apparent authority." ' 9 Justice Stewart emphasized that it was Stoner's
"constitutional right which was at stake here, and not the night clerk's nor the
hotel's." 9 Accordingly, "[i]t was a right.., which only [Stoner] could waive by
word or deed, either directly or through an agent." 99 Finally, although the hotel
clerk had explicitly consented to the search, "there [was] nothing in the record to
indicate that the police had any basis whatsoever to believe that the night clerk
had been authorized by [Stoner] to permit the police to search [his] room."' °
Some have argued that Stoner's logic establishes "that only a person whose
own right is implicated can possess authority to consent."'0 ' Others contend that
"the rationale of Stoner was ambiguous-and perhaps deliberately so" on the
issue of whether the police could reasonably rely upon a third party's permission
to search another's premises.' 2 Ultimately, the Rehnquist Court would embrace
the latter view and conclude that "a warrantless entry is valid when based upon

95. Compare Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 187-88 (1990) ("[Tlhe rationale of Stoner was
ambiguous-and perhaps deliberately so."), with id. at 194-95 n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Stoner itself is
clear, however; today's majority manufactures the ambiguity.").
96. Id.
97. Stoner, 376 U.S. at 488.
98. Id. at 489.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Davies, supra note 7, at 30. Justice Marshall also adopts this position. See Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at
194-95 n. I (Marshall, J., dissenting).
"Our decisions make clear that the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment are not to be eroded
by strained applications of the law of agency or by unrealistic doctrines of 'apparent authority."' The
full sentence thus unambiguously confirms that Stoner rejected any reliance on apparent authority
doctrines.
Nor did the Stoner Court leave open the door for a police officer to rely on a reasonable but
mistaken belief in a third party's authority to consent when it remarked that "there is nothing in the
record to indicate that the police had any basis whatsoever to believe that the night clerk had been
authorized by the petitioner to permit the police to search the petitioner's room."
Id. (quoting Stoner, 376 U.S. at 488-89 (citation omitted)).
102. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 188. In his majority opinion, Justice Scalia found the Stoner holding--"the
rights protected by the Fourth Amendment are not to be eroded . . . by unrealistic doctrines of 'apparent
authority,"' id. at 187 (quoting Stoner, 376 U.S. at 488)-ambiguous, insofar as it was not clear "whether the
word 'unrealistic' is descriptive or limiting-that is, whether we were condemning as unrealistic all reliance
upon apparent authority, or whether we were condemning only such reliance upon apparent authority as is
unrealistic." Id. Moreover, Stoner was ambiguous as to whether the police officers' reliance on the hotel clerk's
consent was unreasonable as "a matter of law, or because the facts could not possibly support it." Id. Under
Scalia's view, "a reasonable reading of [Stoner], and perhaps a preferable one," is not that reliance on a third
party's consent is unreasonable as a matter of law, but that the factual circumstances of the consent in Stoner
made such reliance unreasonable. Id. at 188.
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the consent of a third party whom the police, at the time of the entry, reasonably
believe to possess common authority over the premises, but who in fact does not
do so. '°3

The next important third-party consent case after Stoner was Frazierv. Cupp,
although it might not have seemed so when it was decided in 1969."' During the
course of a murder investigation focused on Frazier and his cousin Rawls, police
arrested Rawls and obtained his consent to search a duffel bag owned by Frazier,
which was being used jointly by Frazier and Rawls and had been left in Rawls'
bedroom.' 5 Although never mentioned in the Court's opinion, at the time of the
search, the police were looking for evidence against Rawls, and there was no
basis for suspecting that the search was aimed at discovering incriminating
evidence against Frazier.' °6 The search of the duffel bag, however, revealed
clothing belonging to Frazier, which was seized and admitted against Frazier at
trial. 0 7 Frazier later contended that Rawls only had permission to use one
compartment of the bag and no authority to consent to a search of other
compartments.'0 8 Speaking for the Court, Justice Marshall "quickly" dismissed
this argument in one cursory paragraph. Refusing to address the "metaphysical
subtleties" inherent in Frazier's claim that Rawls had no authority to consent to a
search of the entire duffel bag, the Court easily concluded that because Frazier
allowed Rawls to use the bag and had left it in Rawls' home, Frazier had
"assumed the risk" that Rawls would let the police search it. '°9
Although not discussed in Frazier,there is an unresolved tension between
Frazier's "assumption of risk" logic and Stoner's apparent rationale that "only
the defendant or his agent could give effective consent" to a search."0 Professor
103. Id. at 179, 188-89.
104. Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969). In between Stoner and Frazier,the Court decided Bumper v.
North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968). The issue in Bumper was whether a search of a home could be justified
on the basis of consent when such consent was given only after the police asserted that they possessed a
warrant. Id. at 548. The Court held that "there can be no consent under such circumstances." Id. Bumper
explained that the state's burden to prove consent cannot be satisfied when the facts indicated "no more than
acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority." Id. at 548-49. When a police officer "claims authority to search a
home under a warrant, he announces in effect that the occupant has no right to resist the search. The situation is
instinct with coercion-albeit colorably lawful coercion. Where there is coercion there cannot be consent." Id.
at 550.
105. Frazier,394 U.S. at 740.
106. See Gladden v. Frazier, 388 F.2d 777, 783 (9th Cir. 1968) (explaining that the police "asked Rawls
if they could have his clothing.... They did not know that the bag did not belong to Rawls until they opened it
and found Frazier's clothing in it."); see also State v. Frazier, 418 P.2d 841, 843 (Or. 1966) ("The search was
made with the consent of Jerry Rawls. This was not a general hunt for evidence of any kind; the bag was opened
for the specific purpose of obtaining the clothing of Rawls and with his permission ....
While it is true that at
the time of Rawls' arrest [Frazier] was a definite suspect and in detention, there is nothing in the record to
disclose that the officers knew that the bag itself might be the property of anyone other than Rawls until the bag
was opened and its contents noted.").
107. Frazier,394 U.S. at 740.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 8.3(a), at 146-47.
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LaFave provides the correct solution to this conflict when he notes that Frazieris
not "the typical third party consent case, where the police solicit the consent of A
in order to search an area in which B has a privacy interest for the express
purpose of finding evidence against B."'" Put differently, the police in Frazier
"did not perceive the situation as involving a third party consent" search." 2 The
main problem with this solution, however, is that the Court would not read
Frazierthe way LaFave read Frazier.Actions speak louder than words, and the
Court's actions soon indicated that Frazier'sassumption of risk theory would be
applied broadly and extend to the typical third-party consent search case where
the police seek the permission of A to invade the privacy of B.
Without acknowledging the tension between Frazier and Stoner, United
States v. Matlock"3 demonstrated that a majority of the Justices accepted
"assumption of risk" analysis as a sufficient doctrinal justification for third-party
consent searches. At the same time, the Court also signaled rejection of Stoner's
suspect-focused analysis, which had indicated, if not held, that only the
individual whose Fourth Amendment rights were at stake could consent to a
search. In Matlock, law enforcement officers arrested Matlock for bank robbery
in the front yard of his home." 4 While Matlock was restrained in a police vehicle
and without asking for his consent to search his room, several officers went to the
front door of the house, where they were admitted to the home by a Mrs. Gayle
Graff." 5 "The officers told [Graff] they were looking for money and a gun and
asked if they could search the house."' 6 Graff gave the officers permission to
search the house, including a bedroom "which she said was jointly occupied by
Matlock and herself.""' 7 The search revealed sincriminating evidence that the
government sought to admit at Matlock's trial.'
Decided less than a year after the ruling in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
Matlock explained that cases like Frazierestablished that when the state seeks to
rely on voluntary consent to justify a search, "it is not limited to proof that
consent was given by the defendant, but may show that permission to search was
obtained from a third party who possessed common authority over or other
sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected."" 9 The

Id. at 147.
11.
112. Id.
113. 415 U.S. 164 (1974).
114. Id. at 166.
115. Id. at 166, 179.
116. Id. at 166.
117. Id.
118. The lower courts upheld exclusion of the evidence on hearsay grounds. The Court, however,
reversed. After finding that a third party who possessed authority over premises could consent to a search
targeting a co-occupant, id. at 171, the Court also found that the government had sustained its burden of proving
that Mrs. Graff's out-of-court statements were legally sufficient to warrant admitting the incriminating evidence
found in the police search. Id. at 177.
119. Id. at 171.
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Court then elaborated in a footnote that the phrase "common authority" did not
turn on property law concepts,
[B]ut rests rather on mutual use of the property by persons generally
having joint access or control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable
to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the
inspection in his own right and that the others have assumed the risk
20 that
one of their number might permit the common area to be searched.'
Put differently, Matlock upheld third-party consent searches on two
independent grounds, either of which was sufficient to make a search
constitutionally reasonable against a person who had legal standing to object to
the search but had not been asked for his or her consent. Those grounds were that
the third party could authorize the search "in his own right," or that the defendant
had "assumed the risk" that a co-occupant would allow the search.' 2'
While Matlock resolved the tension between Frazier and Stoner by
embracing assumption of risk analysis, the Court's solution raised some
troublesome questions about the principled logic of the Court's third-party
consent analysis. As Professor LaFave wondered:
If A and B jointly occupy certain premises, why is it (and when is it) that
A's "own right" to permit a search must prevail over B's right of privacy
in those premises? And to what extent may it truly be said that B's
expectation of privacy in a certain place has been2 destroyed simply
because A enjoys equal property rights in that place?
Thirty years later, a sharply divided Court in Georgia v. Randolph attempted to
answer, albeit not convincingly in the minds of some, some of Professor
LaFave' s questions.
A final comment about Matlock is worth mentioning. In a lone dissent,
Justice Douglas concluded that the failure to obtain a warrant, when there was
time to do so, made the search of Matlock's home constitutionally
unreasonable. 23 Interestingly, Douglas reached this result by relying on the same
reasoning that Justice Frankfurter had proffered in his dissent from Justice
Douglas' majority opinion in Davis. In Davis, Justice Frankfurther discussed the
history of the Fourth Amendment and the Framers' intent to control the

120. Id. at n.7 (emphasis added).
121. Matlock's rationale only applied when the target of the search was absent when the police sought
consent from a third party. See id. at 170 (noting that recent rulings indicate "that the consent of one who
possesses common authority over premises or effects is valid as against the absent, nonconsenting person with
whom that authority is shared" (emphasis added)).
122. LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 8.3(a), at 149.
123. See Matlock, 415 U.S. at 178-88 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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discretionary search and seizure powers of law enforcement officers.'2 4
Frankfurter also cited Court precedents that had established that warrantless
searches of homes and offices were unreasonable searches. 25 In his Matlock
dissent, Douglas returned to the same themes advanced by Frankfurter in his
Davis dissent.
For example, Douglas asserted that "[t]he judicial scrutiny provided by the
second clause of the Amendment is essential to effectuating the Amendment, and
if, under that clause a warrant could have been obtained but was not, the ensuing
search is 'unreasonable' under the Amendment."' 2 6 To support this assertion,
Douglas dropped a long footnote discussing the history of oppressive search and
seizure practices in the colonies. He pointed to the actions of members of the
First Congress who revised the Fourth Amendment's text, according to Douglas,
to "strengthen the Amendment, not to license later judicial efforts to undercut the

warrant requirement."'2 7 He also argued that the Court's precedents in the midtwentieth century had "held that only the gravest of circumstances could excuse
the failure to secure a properly issued search warrant."'' 28 Ultimately, Justice
Douglas condemned the search of Matlock's home, notwithstanding his
girlfriend's permission, because her consent "provide[d] a sorry and wholly
inadequate substitute for the protections which inhere in a judicially granted
warrant."'' 29 He was unwilling to accept the principle "that a search conducted
without a warrant can give more authority than a search conducted with a
warrant."' 3o That result was at odds with the history and underlying purposes of
the Amendment because "the Framers of the Amendment did not abolish the
hated general warrants only to impose another oppressive regime on the
people."'' 3' To put it mildy, there was a "dramatic evolution in Douglas's
thinking"'3 2 on the Fourth Amendment since his decision in Davis.

124. Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 603-05 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 606-09.
126. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 180 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 180-83 n.l (emphasis added).
128. Id. at 183.
129. Id. at 187.
130. Id. This statement by Douglas echoed Justice Frankfurter's earlier statement wherein he observed:
"It cannot be that the Constitution meant to make it legally advantageous not to have a warrant, so that the
police may roam freely and have the courts retrospectively hold that the search that was made was 'reasonable,'
reasonableness being judged from the point of view of obtaining relevant evidence." Davis y. United States, 328
U.S. 582, 595 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
131. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 188 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Cf. Davis, 328 U.S. at 595 (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) (opining that post facto judicial determinations that a warrantless search was reasonable "was
precisely what the Fourth Amendment was meant to stop").
132. MURPHY, supra note 65, at 313.
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III. THE IMPACT OF SCHNECKLOTH V. BUSTAMONTE AND

EXPLAINING ITS UNSPOKEN PREMISES

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte ' is considered the Court's seminal search case
for good reason. But Bustamonte has also been the target of severe and continued
criticism. Bustamonte involved an ordinary traffic stop. 34 After learning that the
driver had no license, an officer was told by one of the passengers that he
possessed a license and that his brother owned the vehicle. The officer then
requested consent to search the car from that passenger. The passenger gave
consent and "actually helped in the search of the car, by opening the trunk and
glove compartment."' 35 The search revealed stolen checks that were later used to
convict Bustamonte, another passenger. After the California state courts upheld
the conviction, the Ninth Circuit ruled that because consent constituted a waiver
of one's Fourth Amendment rights, the state had to show more than an absence
of coercion. 36 Under the Ninth Circuit's reasoning, the state also had to prove
that consent was knowingly provided and could be freely refused.' 37
A.

The Emergence of the Voluntariness Test

Bustamonte was an important case because it gave the Court an opportunity
to clarify the law of consent, and, perhaps, develop a new way of analyzing
consent searches.118 To begin with, there was no controlling precedent to guide
the Court. As discussed above, prior to Bustamonte, the Court had not reached a
consensus on how consent searches should be resolved, particularly in cases
where police discover incriminating evidence against the person who gave
consent.'3 9 The holding in Davis certainly was not considered to be controlling by

133. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
134. See id. at 220.
135. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 220.
136. Id. at 220-22; see also Bustamonte v. Schneckloth, 448 F.2d 699, 700-01 (9th Cir. 1971).
137. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 221-22; Bustamonte, 448 F.2d at 700.
138. Cf. Strauss, supra note 4, at 216 ("[lt was not until 1973, in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, that the
Supreme Court clearly articulated the requirements for a voluntary consent search consistent with the Fourth
Amendment." (footnote omitted)); see also Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 279 n.5 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (after
distinguishing Davis and Zap, noting that there are "no cases decided by th[e] Court explicitly upholding a
search based on the consent of the defendant").
139. Technically speaking, Bustamonte was not a case where the police discovered incriminating
evidence against the person who provided consent, because Bustamonte did not give consent to search the car
he was riding in. See Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 220. Today, someone in Bustamonte's shoes might not have
standing to contest a police search of an automobile pursuant to consent. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128,
148-49 (1978) (ruling that "passengers qua passengers" have no expectation of privacy-in other words, no
"standing" to assert a Fourth Amendment interest-in "the trunk of an automobile, [the glove compartment, or
area underneath the seat of an automobile because] these are areas in which a passenger qua passenger simply
would not normally have a legitimate expectation of privacy"). Indeed, "the Bustamonte Court could have used
an analysis akin to that in Rakas and found that no search affecting Bustamonte had occurred. Under that
approach, the Bustamonte Court would not have reached the question of consent." Goldberger, supra note 36, at
328 (footnote omitted).
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either the parties or the Justices. The briefs in Bustamonte virtually ignored
Davis.14 And other than a couple of insignificant citations, Justice Stewart's main
discussion of Davis in his thirty-one page majority opinion is contained in a
single paragraph. 4' That paragraph cites Davis to refute the lower court's
conclusion that proof of knowledge of the right to refuse consent is a precondition to showing a voluntary consent. 4 2 Davis, according to Bustamonte,
stood for the proposition that the judiciary must consider all the circumstances to
determine whether consent was coerced or not. 43 Nor were the third-party
consent cases determinative in Bustamonte. In fact, Stewart conceded the issue at
stake in Bustamonte was "what constitutes -a valid consent, not who can
consent."' 4 Tellingly, the holdings in the third-party consent search cases were
cited near the end of Stewart's opinion to bolster the previously determined
conclusion that a knowing waiver was not required to prove valid consent under
145
the Fourth Amendment.
Although the Court was writing on a clean slate, it was obvious that the
Bustamonte majority had reached a pre-determined outcome. The Court's
framing of the issue signaled the desired result. According to Justice Stewart,
"the precise question" raised in Bustamonte was "what must the prosecution
prove to demonstrate that a consent was 'voluntarily' given. '',46 But as Professor
LaFave has explained, framing the issue this way is "grossly misleading" and
determines the outcome all at once.' 47 Justice Stewart's framing of the issue is
deceptive because, as LaFave observes, the facts raised at least two questions:
whether one's Fourth Amendment rights could be lost "through coercion only,"

140. The State's opening brief cited Davis one time for the insignificant point that the Court considers
consent to be a question of fact. Brief for the Petitioner at 12, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973)
(No. 71-732). The defendant's brief never cited Davis. See Brief for Respondent, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218 (1973) (No. 71-732). Nor was Davis discussed during oral argument. See Transcript of Oral
Argument, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (No. 71-732).
141.

See Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 233.

142. See id. at 232-33.
143. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 233. Justice Marshall's dissent in Bustamonte, however, suggested that
Davis' specific holding was no longer valid law. He noted that central to the result in Davis was that the items
seized were governmental property, temporarily in Davis' possession. Id. at 279 n.4 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Because the search involved government property, the Davis Court concluded that "permissible limits of
persuasion are not so narrow as where private papers are sought." Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 593
(1946). Marshall argued that the distinction between governmental property and other types of evidentiary
items, so far as the Fourth Amendment was concerned, was eliminated in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294
(1967). See Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 279 n.4 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Rotenberg, supra note 28, at
176 n.9 ("Although consent can be said to be a factor in the Court's analysis in [Davis and Zap], the fact that
'businesses were being inspected' seems to be a larger factor. Neither case defines consent for constitutional
purposes.").
144. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 246 n.34 (emphasis added). Justice Stewart did observe, however, that
"the constitutional validity of third-party consents demonstrates the fundamentally different nature of a consent
search from the waiver of a trial right." Id.
145. See id., 412 U.S. at 245-46.
146.

Id. at 223.

147.

LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 8.1(a), at 12.

2008 / The Good and Bad News About Consent Searches
or whether one's Fourth Amendment rights could also be lost "by unknowing
surrender."'48 These are separate inquires. But Justice Stewart focuses only on the
coercion question.'4 9 Equally telling that the Court had reached a pre-determined
result is the Court's use of a "voluntariness" standard to determine the
constitutional validity of a consent search. 5 ° Justice Stewart never bothered
explaining why he would "import[] into the consent search area the traditional
'voluntariness' test, which proved so ineffective and unworkable in the
confession field that it was largely superseded by the new requirements of
Miranda v. Arizona."' 5'
Moreover, Justice Stewart never considers, let alone addresses, the argument
that the search in Bustamonte conflicted with the Fourth Amendment's warrant
and probable cause requirements. To be sure, in dicta, the Court had assumed
prior to Bustamonte that consent was a valid exception to the warrant
requirement.'52 And counsel for Bustamonte conceded during oral argument that
"consent searches are permissible under the Constitution."' 53 But in the next
breath, he also pointed out that the search in Bustainonte occurred "even though
there [was] no warrant, no probable cause, no one ha[d] been questioned about
any specific crime, no one [was] under arrest," there was no threat to police
safety, and there was not "even the remotest effort made to determine if [the
'
person providing consent] had any notion at all of his right to resist the search."'
Granted, the search at issue intruded upon the privacy of an automobile, not a
private home, which may have lessened the intrusive nature of the search in the
minds of some of the Justices. But, two years earlier, Justice Stewart himself
warned that "[t]he word 'automobile' is not a talisman in whose presence the
Fourth Amendment fades away and disappears."' 55 In any event, there was no

148. Id. As Professor LaFave elaborates
The Court actually had before it the question of whether Fourth Amendment rights were to be
protected from loss through coercion only or also protected from loss by unknowing surrender.
These are two different matters; a person might surrender his privacy in full knowledge of his Fourth
Amendment rights but yet in response to overwhelming police pressure, or might give up his privacy
without the slightest pressure but because of unawareness of his right to decline a police request to
search. Yet, to speak only of voluntariness is immediately to focus on the problem of coercion.
Id.
149. See Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 223-29.
150. Id.
151. LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 8.2, at 51 (footnote omitted).
152. Justice Stewart implied as much in Katz. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357-58 & n.22
(1967) ("[Tlhe mandate of the [Fourth] Amendment requires adherence to judicial processes," and "[a] search
to which an individual consents meets Fourth Amendment requirements." (citing United States v. Jeffers, 342
U.S. 48, 51 (1951); Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624 (1946))).
153. Transcript of Oral Argument at 24, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (No. 71-732);
see also id. at 49 (defense counsel assuming that a person can make a voluntary decision to let the police search
his home or car, but stating "my position is that it can only be done if you are aware of your right to say no").
154. Id. at 25.
155. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 461 (1971) (plurality opinion). Tellingly, there is no
suggestion in Bustamonte that the result in that case would have been different had the consent search been
directed at a home.
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indication that the Court was inclined to assess the constitutionality of a consent
search by examining whether the traditional protections embodied in the Fourth
Amendment had been satisfied.
In sum, the procedural safeguards that the Court had mandated in the early
twentieth century to ensure that a search was reasonable were no longer part of
the discussion in 1973 when the Court analyzed the reasonableness of the search
in Bustamonte. And even assuming that consent was a valid exception to the
warrant and probable cause requirements, Justice Stewart's own conception of
the scope of a valid exception was not discussed in Bustamonte. Two years
before he authored the Court's opinion in Bustamonte, Stewart wrote that
searches conducted without judicial approval "are per se unreasonable"-subject
to a few exceptions. 1 6 Those exceptions, Stewart explained, "are 'jealously and
carefully drawn,' and there must be 'a showing by those who seek exemption...
that the exigencies of the situation made that course imperative."" 57 The consent
exception envisioned and eventually constructed by the Bustamonte Court,
however, was not "carefully drawn," was not designed to protect officer safety,
and was not required by any exigency that made a search imperative under the
circumstances.
By focusing his analysis on whether a challenged consent search was the
result of coercion or not, and ignoring the Fourth Amendment's traditional
safeguards and his own formulation of the scope of a valid exception to the
amendment, Justice Stewart could announce a holding in Bustamonte that
appeared straightforward and easily applied by lower court judges and police
officers. Bustamonte ruled that when the state defends a search on the basis of
consent, it has the burden of proving that the consent was voluntary.' s
"Voluntariness is a question of fact to be determined from all the circumstances
and while the subject's knowledge of a right to refuse is a factor to be taken into
account, the prosecution is not required to demonstrate such knowledge as a
prerequisite to establishing a voluntary consent."' 59 In another part of his opinion,
Justice Stewart explained that "voluntariness" permitted consideration of
subjective factors specific to the person giving consent, including, for example,
"evidence of minimal schooling, low intelligence, and the lack of any effective
warnings to a person of his rights."' 6

156. Id. at 454-55.
157. Id. at 455 (quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948)). A year before
Bustamonte was decided, the Court stated that exceptions to the warrant requirement "are few in number and
carefully delineated," and that, "in general, they serve the legitimate needs of law enforcement officers to
protect their own well-being and preserve evidence from destruction." United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407
U.S. 297, 318 (1972) (citations omitted).
158. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222, 248 (1973).
159. Id. at 248-49.
160. Id. at 248.
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B. The Unspoken Premises that Influenced the Bustamonte Court

Bustamonte's holding was widely criticized when it was announced. 6' The
ruling is still harshly criticized today. 62 Rather than repeat this criticism, much of
which I find convincing, at this stage in the still evolving development of the law
of consent, it may be more helpful to identify the concerns and mode of thinking
that affected the Bustamonte Court. Looking back, some of the concerns that
influenced the Bustamonte Court were not openly discussed in Justice Stewart's
majority opinion. As I hope to demonstrate, the unspoken premises that
motivated the Bustamonte Court continue to impact the analysis and rulings of
the current Justices. This section attempts to identify some of these concerns.
In Bustamonte, the Ninth Circuit ruled that to prove valid consent, the state
had to show both an absence of coercion and that the subject knew he could
refuse consent. 63 As understood by the Bustamonte majority, the Ninth Circuit
had formulated a rigid rule that consent could not be established "solely from the
absence of coercion and a verbal expression of assent."' 64 Several factors
prompted the Court to reject this rule.
First, Justice Stewart never indulged, let alone accepted, the Ninth Circuit's
view that "[u]nder many circumstances a reasonable person might read an
officer's 'May I' as the courteous expression of a demand backed by force of
law."' 65 Indeed, Bustamonte appeared to adopt the opposite conclusion: an

161. See LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 8.1(a), at 11 n.28 (providing citations).
162. For a sampling of the criticism, see, for example, LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 8.1(a), at 12-15;
Wesley MacNeil Oliver, With an Evil Eye and an Unequal Hand: PretextualStops and DoctrinalRemedies to
Racial Profiling, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1409, 1467-76 (2000); James A. Adams, Search and Seizure as Seen by
Supreme Court Justices:Are They Serious or Is This Just JudicialHumor?, 12 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 413,
446-49 (1993); Robert V. Ward, Consenting to a Search and Seizure in Poor and Minority Neighborhoods: No
Placefor a "Reasonable Person ", 36 How. L.J. 239, 244-45 (1993); Adrian J. Barrio, Rethinking Schneckloth
v. Bustamonte: IncorporatingObedience Theory Into the Supreme Court's Conception of Voluntary Consent,
1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 215; Rotenberg, supra note 28; Strauss, supra note 4; Thomas, supra note 8, at 545-46. A
recent symposium of the Texas Tech Law Review contained four articles by Professors John M. Burkoff,
Morgan Cloud, Christo Lassiter, and Russell L. Weaver discussing the Court's consent search doctrine. See
Symposium, Citizen Ignorance, Police Deception, and the Constitution, 39 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1109, 11091206 (2007). None of these articles had a kind or positive word about Bustamonte. See, e.g., Burkoff, supra
note 5, at 1113-32; Cloud, supra note 15, at 1148-58; Christo Lassiter, Consent to Search by Ignorant People,
39 TEX.TECH. L. REV. 1171, 1176 (2007) ("No choice is made by one who is ignorant of the right of refusal of
consent. Without knowledge or intelligence concerning options, there can be no choice among options. Without
knowledge and intelligence, a choice can be made without physical violence or threat of violence; however, one
could argue that such a choice is not, and cannot, truly be, voluntary."); Russell L. Weaver, The Myth of
"Consent," 39 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1195, 1198 (2007) ("From the standpoint of constitutional doctrine, it is
difficult to justify the [Bustamonte] holding or to understand how a suspect can waive an important
constitutional right without knowledge of its existence.").
163. Bustamonte v. Schneckloth, 448 F.2d 699, 700 (9th Cir. 1971) (determining consent, court must
"determine from all the circumstances whether the verbal assent reflected an understanding, uncoerced, and
unequivocal election to grant the officers a license which the person knows may be freely and effectively
withheld" (quoting Cipres v. United States, 343 F.2d 95, 97 (9th Cir. 1965))).
164. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 222.
165. Bustamonte, 448 F.2d at 701. Although Justice Stewart never bothered to reply to this conclusion,
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officer's requesting consent indicates that the subject has the ability to refuse.
Because Justice Stewart viewed a request for consent as non-coercive, he never
challenged the state's contention that "the very fact that consent is given carries
the implication that an alternative of refusal existed." '66 Essentially, the state was
asking the Court to embrace the following proposition: A person's conduct or
verbal assent following an officer's request for consent was sufficient to
demonstrate, without more, a prima facie case of consent. Once a prima facie
case was shown, the burden was on the defendant to show something unusual
about the police questioning that made the consent coerced or some other overt
act of police coercion. 167 If no evidence of overt coercion was present, then a
request for consent and verbal assent or conduct manifesting acquiescence,
standing alone, could prove valid consent as a matter of law. 68 In effect, the state
was asking the Court to reject the Ninth Circuit's per se rule and substitute in its
place another bright-line rule.
Concededly, the state's claim was never cited in Justice Stewart's opinion;
thus there is no definitive proof that the Bustamonte majority embraced the
state's position. Even so, Stewart was known as a justice who "paid careful
attention to briefs and oral argument."'' 69 Moreover, although Justice Stewart
never expressly cited the prosecution's argument that a request for consent
carries the implication that a right of refusal exists, he was undoubtedly aware of
the Ninth Circuit's ruling in Bustamonte. That ruling specifically rejected the
California state courts' understanding of consent, which approved the principle
both Justice Douglas and Justice Marshall endorsed this view. See Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 275-76 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); id. at 288-89 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (agreeing with the Ninth Circuit's statement and further
noting that in most cases "consent is ordinarily given as acquiescence in an implicit claim of authority to
search").
166. Transcript of Oral Argument at 11, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (No. 71-732);
see also id. at 12:
QUESTION: As I understand your brief, your argument in part was that the very fact of a request by
the officer gave-amounted to an inference, an indication that the request could be denied.
MR. GRANUCCI: Yes, that's right, Mr. Chief Justice. And the Ninth Circuit discounted that by
saying that verbal assent is not enough.
167. Cf. id. at 51-52:
QUESTION: So you're saying that on the evidence in this record there was a prima facie case for
consent?
MR. GRANUCCI: Yes.
QUESTION: And as long as the officer asks, and he consents then at least the burden of going
forward with the evidence shifts?
MR. GRANUCCI: I think that's right, Your Honor. Although I would say this, that if you had guns
or something like that, that'sQUESTION: Well, obviously.
MR. GRANUCCI: ... Verbal expression of permission to search. Then you look for no implied
assertion of authority, and of course no overt coercion.
168. See id.
169.

JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 262 (1994).
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that "the mere request for consent carries with it an implication that consent may
be withheld and that knowledge of this implication may be inferred from
assent."' 7 Perhaps, in the eyes of a majority of the Justices, the state's submission
that requesting consent carries with it the implication that an alternative of refusal
existed was so intuitively correct there was no need to reference or address the
claim. Whatever the case, looking back, it seems the Bustamonte majority agreed
with the state's position that an officer's request for consent and verbal assent
was enough to place, if not the legal burden, a tacit burden on the defendant to
offer other evidence proving an invalid consent. In fact, that was the conclusion
mandated by Bustamonte'sjudgment when, rather than remanding the case to the
Ninth Circuit so that it could apply the "voluntariness" test newly announced by
the Court, Justice Stewart determined that under the facts presented, there was no
response to the police request for consent was
reason to believe that the
"presumptively coerced.' 71
The second and perhaps most important factor that influenced the result in
Bustamonte was the Court's determination not to create another Miranda.'72 The
contrast in judicial perspective between Miranda and Bustamonte is striking. In
the aftermath of Escobedo v. Illinois, 3 the Court was poised to issue a major
announcement on the constitutionality of police interrogation practices.7 4 As
Miranda demonstrated, a majority of the Court believed that interrogation
practices, as then existed, were manipulative and coercive of the suspect, and,
thus, threatened core values embodied in the Fifth Amendment's SelfIncrimination Clause. 75 These concerns produced Miranda, which ruled that
persons subjected to custodial interrogation by the police must be informed of

170. Bustamonte, 448 F. 2d at 700; see also People v. Bustamonte, 76 Cal. Rptr. 17, 20 (Ct. App. 1969)
(explaining the basic premise of California law on consent: "When permission is sought from a person of
ordinary intelligence the very fact that consent is given . . . carries the implication that the alternative of a
refusal existed." (quoting People v. Macintosh, 70 Cal. Rptr. 667, 670 (1968))).
171. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 247 (1973) ("There is no reason to believe, under
circumstances such as are present here, that the response to a policeman's question is presumptively coerced
172. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
173. 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (holding that Escobedo's confession, taken during a police interrogation
session while he was under arrest and after he had requested and been denied access to his lawyer, violated the
Sixth Amendment's right to counsel and was inadmissible at Escobedo's trial).
174. See LIVA BAKER, MIRANDA: CRIME, LAW AND POLITICS 87-88 (1983) (describing the "legal
quagmire" created by Escobedo, and the collection of certiorari petitions that presented Escobedo issues). Cf
Yale Kamisar, Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of American Criminal Procedure: From Powell
to Gideon, From Escobedo to .... in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN OUR TIME 55-64 (A.E. Dick Howard ed., 1965)
(describing the easy questions arising from Escobedo, which "most state courts are muffing," and the hard
questions, which courts "are unlikely to reach"); Developments in the Law: Confessions, 79 HARV. L. REv. 935,
1001 (1966) (noting post-Escobedo federal appeals court rulings interpreting Escobedo as merely "reworking"
the voluntariness test for determining the admissiblity of confessions, despite the fact that the Escobedo Court
refused to address the voluntariness issue and the "explicit sixth amendment foundation" of Escobedo's
holding).
175. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445-58.
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their right to remain silent and right to have counsel present.1 6 Under Miranda,
custodial interrogation may not occur unless the suspect specifically waives his
or her rights to remain silent and the presence of counsel.'77
Seven years later, when the constitutionality of consent searches was
addressed, a majority of the Justices held no skepticism toward consent searches.
There was no angst or anger about consent searches similar to the feelings that
bothered the majority in Miranda regarding incommunicado police interrogation.
Consent searches were good, not bad. 78 And certainly the Bustamonte Court felt
no need, let alone urgency, to level the playing-field between officer and suspect
as the MirandaCourt had attempted to do when it mandated its famous warnings.
To the contrary, the Court repeatedly emphasized that "the community has a real
interest in encouraging consent, for the resulting search may yield necessary
evidence for the solution and prosecution of crime, evidence that may insure that
a wholly innocent person is not wrongly charged with a criminal offense."'' 79 This
perspective, when combined with the previous discussed factor that the
Bustamonte majority believed that the typical police request for consent was not
coercive, made it easy to reject extending Miranda's logic to consent searches. In
fact, Justice Stewart likened a request for a consent search to a police officer's
questioning of a pedestrian or witness who is knowledgeable about the facts
surrounding a crime.8 s This type of non-custodial questioning does not trigger
Miranda warnings, and Stewart pointed out that Miranda itself stated that "'[i]t is
an act of responsible citizenship for individuals to give whatever information
8 Justice Stewart characterized
they may have to aid in law enforcement." '8
Miranda-type warnings in this context as "artificial restrictions" that would
jeopardize "the basic validity" of consent searches.'82
176. Id. at 467-72.
177. Id. at475.
178. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 229 (1973) (noting the "basic validity" of consent
searches and the "continuing validity of consent searches").
179. Id. at 243.
180. Id. at 231-32.
181. Id. at 232 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477-78 (1966)).
182. Id. at 229. Justice Stewart's determination not to create another Miranda certainly impacted his
thinking on consent searches specifically and the Fourth Amendment generally. Justice Stewart opined that the
typical consent search was the equivalent of ajudicially authorized search. Thus, he stated "[t]he actual conduct
of [a consent] search may be precisely the same as if the police had obtained a warrant." Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
at 243. Of course, far from being the equivalent of a judicially authorized search, assent to a consent search
gives the police the authority and discretion to perform an open-ended search with virtually no limits. See
accompanying text supra notes 18-20. The irony here is that Stewart has traditionally been considered a strong
proponent of the warrant requirement. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971)
(plurality opinion) ("[Tihe most basic constitutional rule ... is that 'searches conducted outside the judicial
process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendmentsubject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions."' (quoting Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967))); id. at 481; H. Richard Uviller, Reasonability and the Fourth Amendment: A
(Belated) Farewell to Justice PotterStewart, 25 CRIM. L. BULL. 29, 33 n.14 (1989) ("I suggest only that in the
seminal 1960's, Stewart led the contingent that found in the Fourth Amendment a preference for searches and
seizures by warrant.").
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Finally, the Bustamonte Court must have believed that its ruling provided
sufficient means to identify actual instances of unlawful consent and would not
allow police to coerce consent or take advantage of vulnerable persons. Although
not stated as such, Bustamonte's "voluntariness" standard was actually a
balancing test." 3 Part of that balancing test permitted consideration of "the set of

values reflecting society's deeply felt belief that the criminal law cannot be used
as an instrument of unfairness, and that the possibility of unfair and even brutal
police tactics poses a real and serious threat to civilized notions of justice."'4
Thus, the Court explained that the "voluntariness" test allowed for consideration
of the "characteristics of the accused.'. 8 It also required "the most careful
scrutiny" of police conduct.16 Lastly, the Court emphasized the narrow scope of
its holding. Three times Justice Stewart stated that the Court's holding only
applied to persons "not in custody.' 8 .
In sum, important premises, some of which were unspoken, provided the
foundation for Bustamonte. Identifying these viewpoints may help us better
understand the origins of Bustamonte's holding. Not surprisingly, a few of the
premises that supported Bustamonte continue to impact the development of the
law of consent searches. But the modern Court's willingness to follow
Bustamonte's logic and holding has been uneven and unpredictable. In fact, the
modern Justices have abandoned significant aspects of Bustamonte.
C. The Declining Significance of Bustamonte and the Rise of a "Reasonableness " Model for Judging Consent Searches
Bustamonte's legacy with the modern Court has been interesting to observe.
In some cases, both the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have upheld consent
searches in scenarios considerably more coercive than the facts in Bustamonte
and justified these rulings as being dictated by Bustamonte. In other cases, it is
evident that the Court has discarded Bustamonte's voluntariness test and
substituted a standard of review that affords considerable deference to police
efforts to obtain a person's consent.

183. Justice Stewart acknowledged that there was no ready definition for the concept of "voluntariness."
See Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 224 (quoting Justice Frankfurter's observation that "[tihe notion of 'voluntariness'
is itself an amphibian"). Justice Stewart then explained that "'voluntariness' has reflected an accommodation of
the complex of values implicated in police questioning of a suspect." Id. at 224-25; see also Strauss, supra note
4, at 217 ("[Tjhe Court ...decided to base its definition of voluntariness on a consideration of the competing
policy considerations. That is, the Court held that the meaning of voluntary consent must reflect a balance
between the conflicting interests involved in police searches.").
184. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 225.
185. See id. at 226.
186. Id. at 229. The Court stated, "In examining all the surrounding circumstances to determine if in fact
the consent to search was coerced, account must be taken of subtly coercive police questionings, as well as the
possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person who consents. Those searches that are the product of police
coercion can thus be filtered out without undermining the continuing validity of consent searches." Id.
187. Id. at 248; see also id. at 240-41 n.29, 247 & n.36.
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Some of the post-Bustamonte rulings reveal that the modem Court has
transformed Bustamonte from its self-described narrow, fact-specific holding to a
ruling that adopts a presumption of valid consent whenever the police ask for
consent and there is assent, even in contexts that differ dramatically from the
scenario involved in Bustamonte. Consider the results in United States v.
Watson' and Ohio v. Robinette. 9 Both of these cases reveal that Bustamonte's
"narrow" holding posed no bar against extending that ruling to scenarios
involving significantly more police pressure. As noted above, Bustamonte
emphasized that its holding did not apply to the situation where police sought
consent from a person in police custody.' 9° The Bustamonte Court not only
acknowledged "the heightened possibilities for coercion when the 'consent' to
search was given by a person in custody,"' 9' it specifically relied upon the
distinction between custodial and non-custodial police questioning for its
holding. 92 Despite this significant limitation on the scope of Bustamonte's
holding, Watson and Robinette read Bustamonte as if that restriction never
existed.
In United States v. Watson, the Ninth Circuit ruled that Watson's arrest was
unconstitutional because federal law enforcement officers had failed to secure an
arrest warrant during a time period when they had probable cause to arrest
Watson. 193 The Ninth Circuit also ruled that Watson's consent to search his car,
given to the officer shortly after his arrest but without knowledge of his right to
withhold consent, was illegally obtained.' 94 The Court, in an opinion written by
Justice White, reversed the Ninth Circuit on both issues.'" Most of Justice
White's opinion is devoted to answering the question of whether the Fourth
Amendment requires a warrant for a public arrest, even when the police have
time to secure a warrant. 96 After answering that question in the negative, White
turned to the consent issue, which had not been addressed in any detail by the

188. 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
189. 519 U.S. 33 (1996).
190. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
191. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 240 n.29.
192. Id. at 247.
In this case, there is no evidence of any inherently coercive tactics-either from the nature of the
police questioning or the environment in which it took place. Indeed, since consent searches will
normally occur on a person's own familiar territory, the specter of incommunicado police
interrogation in some remote station house is simply inapposite. There is no reason to believe, under
circumstances such as are present here, that the response to a policeman's question is presumptively
coerced; and there is, therefore, no reason to reject the traditional test for determining the
voluntariness of a person's response.
Id. (footnote omitted)).
193. United States v. Watson, 504 F.2d 849, 852 (9th Cir. 1974).
194. Id. at 852-53.
195. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411,414-15,423-25 (1976).
196. See id. at 414-24.
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court below, nor "thoroughly briefed" by the parties.'97 Namely, what standard

should apply to determine the validity of a search that is authorized by the
consent of a person in lawful police custody.
Justice White quickly resolved this issue, making it appear as if Bustamonte
had already decided the question. He observed that there was no evidence of
overt or subtle coercion against Watson "proved or claimed."' 98 Nor was custody
by itself sufficient to show coerced consent.' 99 According to Justice White, the
absence of evidence that Watson knew of his right to refuse consent, albeit a
factor to consider, was not controlling under Bustamonte.200 Finally, Justice White
stated that despite being given Miranda warnings and told that "the results of the
search of his car could be used against him," Watson still consented. 20' Put
another way, an officer's request to search and a suspect's assent indicates that
refusal was considered and rejected. This was enough to establish consent as a
matter of law. A contrary result, White asserted, would be inconsistent with
Bustamonte's voluntariness standard.
In Robinette, the Court framed the issue as "whether the Fourth Amendment
requires that a lawfully seized defendant be advised that he is 'free to go' before
his consent will be recognized as voluntary."20'3 A unanimous Court concluded
that no such advice was necessary to obtain a valid consent. 204 As in Watson, the
Robinette Court addressed the consent issue as if Bustamonte had already
decided the merits. In summary fashion, Robinette explained that Bustamonte had
already rejected adopting any per se rules for determining the validity of a
consent search. 205 Likewise, Robinette noted that just as Bustamonte had
concluded that it was impractical to have police provide warnings before
obtaining consent, "so too would it be unrealistic to require police officers to
always inform detainees that they are free to go before a consent search may be
deemed voluntary."20 6
Watson and Robinette show that the Court is quick to extend, without much
analysis, Bustamonte's holding to scenarios involving significant police coercion.
The request for consent in Watson occurred while the defendant was under

197. Id. at 456 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
198. Id. at 424 (majority opinion).
199. Id. at 424-25. Although Justice White relied on Bustamonte, he did not pause to acknowledge that
the Bustamonte Court considered consent obtained from a person in custody to be a very significant (and
apparently troubling) factor, so much so that the Court reserved judgment on the issue. See Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 240-41 n.29, 247 n.36 (1973).
200. Watson, 423 U.S. at 424.
201. Id. at 425.
202. Id.
203. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 35 (1996).
204. Id.at 35.
205. Id. at 39.
206. Id. at 39-40.
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arrest. 0 7 Both Miranda and Bustamonte expressly recognized that there is a
constitutional difference between custodial and non-custodial police questioning.
In Watson, Justice White brushes aside this difference by asserting that "the fact
of custody alone has never been enough in itself to demonstrate a coerced
confession or consent to search. 20 8 Justice White's assertion is misleading for
two reasons. First, Watson's consent claim was not based on the fact of custody
alone. The consent in Watson was the product of custody and police questioning.
Miranda held that custodial interrogation is presumed to be inherently coercive.
If interrogation of a suspect in custody is coercive, "it is not easy to see why it is
not likewise [coercive] with respect to the solicitation of consent to search from
one in custody." 2°9 Second, the thrust of Watson's consent claim was not that
custody by itself had been, or was then, sufficient to show coercion. Rather, his
claim raised the question whether custody is enough to justify applying a
different rule than the one announced in Bustamonte. The fears raised in
Bustamonte against requiring the police to provide warnings disappear once the
suspect is in custody.2 ° More importantly, custody changes the dynamics of the
police-citizen encounter to favor the police, as Bustamonte recognized. 2 ' These
differences, however, were neither acknowledged nor addressed by the Watson
majority.
Robinette raises similar concerns about the Court extending Bustamonte's
holding without serious analysis, although the case is closer to Bustamonte than
Watson. Robinette, like Bustamonte, involved the detention of a motorist for a
traffic stop; factually, the cases were similar. What made Robinette different
from Bustamonte was not the facts, but legal doctrine. The Court's own caselaw,
as it developed since Bustamonte, recognized that the exchange between officer
and citizen during a traffic stop was not an "arm's length" meeting. Justice
Stewart's opinion in Bustamonte analogized a request for a consent search to an

207. Watson, 423 U.S. at 413.
208. Id. at 424.
209. LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 8.2(i), at 113. Of course, the provision of Miranda warnings to Watson
is of no consequence because those warnings did not inform Watson of his Fourth Amendment right to withhold
consent to search his car. A specific Fourth Amendment warning that a suspect in custody has a right to
withhold consent and that refusal will be respected by the police "may serve to fortify the accused against the
coercion inherent in the custodial setting." Gentile v. United States, 419 U.S. 979, 981 (1974) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
210. See Gentile, 419 U.S at 981-82 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citation omitted):
[Bustamontel believed that warning the subject of his right to refuse [consent] would be
"impractical" under the "informal and unstructured conditions" of a roadside search. Yet the
circumstances under which an arrestee in police custody meets with his captors are hardly
"unstructured." When a suspect is in custody the situation is in control of the police. The pace of
events will not somehow deny them an opportunity to give a warning, as the [Bustamonte] Court
apparently feared would happen in noncustodial settings. Moreover, the custodial setting will permit
easy documentation of both the giving of a warning and the arrestee's response.
211. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 247 (1973) ("In this case, there is no evidence of
any inherently coercive tactics--either from the nature of the police questioning or the environment in which it
took place.").
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officer questioning a pedestrian who is not in police custody or otherwise subject
to seizure by the police." 2 After Bustamonte, however, the Court ruled that
whenever police stop a motorist in transit, a seizure has occurred under the
Fourth Amendment. Stopping a vehicle and detaining and questioning its
occupants is a seizure, "even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the
resulting detention quite brief.",213 Moreover, the Court stated that a traffic stop
can involve an "unsettling show of authority" and often generates "substantial
anxiety' 21 4 even for the innocent motorist. Seven years after Bustamonte was
decided, even Justice Stewart recognized that "[s]topping or diverting an
automobile in transit... is materially more intrusive than a question put to a
passing pedestrian., 21 5 In another case, the Court recognized that "[c]ertainly few
motorists would feel free to either disobey a directive to pull over or to leave the
scene of a traffic stop without being told they might do so. ''216 Accordingly, the
Court ruled that motorists arrested for misdemeanor offenses are in "custody" for
purposes of Miranda and are entitled to warnings before being questioned by the
police.217
The Court's cases decided between Bustamonte and Robinette also
recognized that police officers have substantial discretion when deciding which
motorists to stop and how each stop will be resolved. 2 8 The typical motorist is
aware of this discretionary authority, which, of course, adds to the tension of the
ordinary traffic stop. Because an officer might abuse his or her authority either in
deciding which motorists to stop or how those stops will be resolved, the Court
has imposed constitutional rules for motorist detentions that are not applicable to
police-pedestrian encounters. Furthermore, the motorist seized in a traffic stop is
not positioned to know the lawful limits of the officer's authority, nor the extent
of his or her own right to leave or terminate the seizure. All of these Fourth
Amendment concerns, developed subsequent to Bustamonte, prompted the Ohio
Supreme Court to rule that before police request consent to search from a
motorist who was previously subject to seizure, the police must inform the
motorist that they are free to leave.2 9 Notwithstanding this altered legal
landscape, the Robinette Court saw no difference between the consent issue
presented in Bustamonte and the issue raised in Robinette.

212. Id.
213. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979).
214. Id. at 657.
215. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 556-57 (1980) (plurality opinion).
216. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 436 (1984).
217. Id. at 429, 434.
218. See, e.g., Prouse, 440 U.S. at 659, 661 (noting that "[v]ehicle stops for traffic violations occur
countless times each day," and every motorist is subject to a "multitude of applicable traffic and equipment
regulations"-rules which are not applicable to pedestrians-that give police substantial discretion on deciding
which motorists to stop).
219. See State v. Robinette, 653 N.E.2d 695, 699 (Ohio 1995).
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While Watson and Robinette indicate that the modern Court is still willing to
utilize aspects of Bustamonte to encourage consent searches, other rulings show
that the Court will ignore Bustamonte's voluntariness test and employ an
objective, "reasonableness" standard that provides great deference, if not outright
encouragement, to consent searches. For example, Florida v. Jimeno220 and
United States v. Drayton,22' discussed below in Section IV of this article,
demonstrate that the Court has eliminated any consideration of a suspect's
subjective characteristics when determining whether the police acted lawfully
when obtaining consent and when deciding the scope of a suspect's consent.222
Indeed, Jimeno best illustrates the modern Court's abandonment of Bustamonte's
"voluntariness" test and its substitution of a "reasonableness" test that considers
only objective facts or criteria.223
Specifically, Jimeno concerned the scope of a person's consent when they
give police permission to search the interior of their automobile. Jimeno had been
stopped for a traffic violation.224 The officer told Jimeno that he suspected that
drugs were in the vehicle and asked for consent to search the vehicle. 22 Although
the officer informed Jimeno that he did not have to provide consent, the officer
also informed Jimeno that if he did not provide consent, the officer would seek a
warrant to search the car.226 After Jimeno gave permission to search the vehicle,
the officer opened a brown paper bag that was laying on the floorboard and found
cocaine inside.227 The trial court found that Jimeno's "mere consent to search the
car did not carry with it specific consent to open the bag and examine its
contents., 228 Despite this finding, Chief Justice Rehnquist explained that "[t]he
standard for measuring the scope of a suspect's consent under the Fourth
Amendment is that of 'objective' reasonableness-what would the typical
reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the
suspect? 2 29 Thus, even when the question concerns what a suspect intended

220. 500 U.S. 248 (1991).
221. 536 U.S. 194 (2002).
222. In two post-Bustamonte cases, Watson and United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980), the
Court did discuss the defendant's subjective characteristics in determining whether the consent provided to the
police was voluntary. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424-25 (1976); Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 55859 (plurality opinion).
223. See Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 249-51.
224. Id. at 249.
225. id.
226. See William J. Stuntz, Privacy's Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 MICH. L. REV.
1016, 1064 n.175 (1995) (citing Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 3, Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S.
248 (1991) (No. 90-622)). Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Jimeno never mentions the officer's statement
to seek a warrant if Jimeno refused to provide consent. See Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 249-50.
227. Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 249-50.
228. Id. at 250.
229. Id. at 251.

2008 / The Good and Bad News About Consent Searches
when he gave consent to search, the suspect's subjective characteristics or state
210
of mind are constitutionally irrelevant.
Watson, Robinette, and Jimeno demonstrate at least two things about how the
Court approaches consent searches. One, despite what Justice Stewart said about
the narrow scope of Bustamonte's holding, the modem Court has extended that
holding to contexts involving significantly greater degrees of police pressure than
involved in Bustamonte. Two, the Court continues to adhere to Bustamonte's
unstated premise that a police request for consent indicates that the subject has
the capacity to refuse. When the latter rule is combined with the fact that the
Court no longer considers the subjective characteristics or intent of the defendant
when deciding the validity of a challenged consent search, the upshot of the
Court's rulings is that unless a person can show some extraordinary circumstance
surrounding his or her encounter with the police, consent will invariably be
deemed valid, whether the target is subject to police custody or not.
The lower courts have gotten the message and rarely consider subjective
traits of the suspect when analyzing consent cases. 23' As several legal scholars
have acknowledged, "the subjectivity requirement of [Bustamonte] is dead. 232

230. As Professor Stuntz has explained, if a genuine "reasonable person" standard was applied in
Jimeno,
it is hard to imagine anyone concluding that the search .. . was consensual. A uniformed, armed
police officer had just stopped Jimeno's car and told him he was suspected of drug trafficking. Not
many people would say "no" to the police under those circumstances. After all, Jimeno was
"consenting" to a search that he knew would uncover a kilogram of cocaine. Either he was crazy or,
more plausibly, he assumed he had no choice. As the Court's decision suggests, the real standard
applied in cases of this sort is not the "reasonable person" test that courts cite but rather a kind of
Jeopardy rule: if the officer puts his command in the form of a question, consent is deemed
voluntary and the evidence comes in.
Stuntz, supra note 226, at 1063-64 (footnote omitted).
231. See Strauss, supra note 4, at 222-27. Professor Strauss read every published consent search case,
federal and state, over a three year period. She "discovered only a handful of cases-out of hundreds of
decisions-in which the court analyzed the suspect's particular subjective factors." Id. at 222. This research
lead to the conclusion "that consent searches are upheld except in extreme cases that almost always focus not on
subjective factors of the suspect, but on the behavior of the police." Id. at 227; see also Brian A. Sutherland,
Note, Whether Consent to Search was Given Voluntarily: A StatisticalAnalysis of Factors that Predict the
Suppression Rulings of the FederalDistrict Courts, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2192 (2006). Sutherland found that the
"factors associated with the individual traits and subjective state of mind of the defendant were seldom
discussed in the trial court opinions and thus are poor predictors of the outcome of the suppression ruling." Id.
at 2195. Sutherland's statistical analysis reached the conclusion that, although Bustamonte requires a totality of
the circumstances approach to judging the voluntariness of consent,
in practice courts will find consent voluntary in the absence of police misconduct. The statistical
evidence ... shows that factors related to police misconduct-such as illegal entries, illegal seizures,
and threats-are correlated with courts' final determinations of suppression motions. At the same
time, acts that are considered coercive but may be necessary to police work-such as placing the
suspect in some form of custody or unholstering firearms-lack meaningful correlation.
Id. at 2225.
232. Simmons, supra note 5, at 779; see also DAVID COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN
THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 32-33 (1999) (describing a law student's paper reviewing all cases
involving consent searches decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit:
"In most of the cases, the courts did not even discuss the subjective factors that [Bustamonte] said would be
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Rather than considering the subjective traits or state of mind of the person
providing consent, the Court has openly moved to a "reasonableness" model that
determines the validity of a consent search by simply asking whether the search
was reasonable. And the "reasonableness" the Court has in mind is the objective
conduct of the police. As Justice Scalia put it in Illinois v. Rodriguez, a thirdparty consent case, what the Fourth Amendment assures "is not that no
government search of [a person's] house will
233 occur unless he consents; but that
no search will occur that is 'unreasonable.'
IV. THE IMPORTANCE

OF ASSERTING FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS:

UNITED STATES V. DRAYTON AND JUSTICE KENNEDY'S
CONCEPTION OF A VALID CONSENT SEARCH

The next important case that explains the modem Court's approach to
consent search cases is United States v. Drayton.234 Drayton held that police need
not advise bus passengers of their right to refuse cooperation when seeking
consent to search their possessions and bodies. 235 In many ways, Drayton,
decided in 2002, was a replay of Florida v. Bostick, which over a decade earlier
adopted the constitutional rule that bus passengers feel free to terminate a police

relevant in determining voluntariness"; rather than "focusing on the subjective characteristics of the defendant,
courts generally focus on the conduct of the police."); Strauss, supra note 4, at 221-22 ("Although the Supreme
Court in [Bustamonte] suggested that a defendant could try to invalidate the consent to search based on
numerous subjective factors relating to the suspect's mental state or character, it is a rare case in which the court
actually analyzes any of these factors. Even more rare is the case where the court finds them determinative and
excludes the evidence."); The Fourth Amendment and Antidilution, supra note 30, at 2193 (stating that lower
courts have rejected "the subjective inquiry into an individual's knowledge [of the right to refuse consent] and
susceptibility to coercion").
233. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 183 (1990) (citation omitted); see Williams, supra note 5, at 74
(persuasively explaining that the defendant in Rodriguez "never 'voluntarily' consent to the search [of his
home] and never voluntarily authorized his former girlfriend to consent to a search"). In another part of his
article, Professor Williams notes that Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983), United States v. Mendenhall, and
Drayton
show quite clearly .. . that the power to withhold consent is governed by objective considerations,
particularly the observable conduct of the law-enforcement agents; the particulars of the search
target's mental and emotional states are irrelevant, except in the very limited sense that such
particulars might bring a different shade to how the Court reacts to the events leading up to the act of
consent.
Id. at 86. Indeed, Professor Williams contends that the Court has always employed a reasonableness test for
judging the constitutional validity of consent searches:
What happened in Bustamonte and all of the other consent-search cases is what happened in
Rodriquez: the Court evaluated a civilian-police encounter and inquired into whether the crimefighting methodology was minimally acceptable. The Court might dress up the analysis with
evocative metaphysical notions, but only naIvet6 or the desire to erect a straw-man critique prevents
one from seeing that the Court purports to do nothing more, and nothing less, than assess
reasonableness.
Id. at 92-93 (footnote omitted).
234. 536 U.S. 194 (2002).
235. Id. at 206-07.
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encounter when officers request to see their identification and seek consent to
search their luggage.2 16 Bostick has been a much criticized opinion, 237 but that
criticism did not deter the Drayton majority from expanding the authority given
the police in Bostick. The Bostick Court had only decided that a bus passenger
had not been seized as a per se matter when police asked to see his ticket and
identification, and requested consent to search his luggage after informing him of
his right to refuse.
Unlike Bostick, Drayton involved both whether the
defendants had been seized and whether their consent to search their bags had
been voluntarily obtained.
The pertinent facts in Drayton were the following: After all the passengers
had reboarded a bus during a scheduled stop, the driver left the bus and three
police officers boarded the bus. 239 One officer knelt on the driver's seat; a second
officer stood at the rear of the bus; and the third officer approached and
questioned individual passengers about their travel plans, "sought to match
passengers with luggage in the overhead racks," and asked individual passengers
' This
for consent to search their luggage for narcotics and illegal weapons. 40
officer did not inform passengers of their right to refuse a consent search. 24'
Writing for the majority in Drayton, Justice Kennedy ruled that the
defendants, Drayton and Brown, companions on the bus, had not been seized
when the officer questioned them about narcotics and illegal weapons while they
were seated. 242 Kennedy also held that the defendants validly consented to have
their bodies searched, including the areas around their upper thighs, even though
they were not informed of their right to refuse.) 3 Specifically, Drayton's consent
occurred after officers discovered narcotics on Brown and arrested him. The third
officer then turned to Drayton and said, "Mind if I check you?"'244 Without a
verbal response, Drayton lifted his hands above his legs, which allowed the
officer to pat down his legs and detect narcotics concealed underneath his pants
near his upper thigh 245

236. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991).
237. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, "Power, Not Reason": Justice Marshall's Valedictory and the Fourth
Amendment in the Supreme Court's 1990 Term, 70 N.C. L. REV. 373, 396-400 (1992); Wayne R. LaFave,
PinguitudinousPolice, PachydermatousPrey: Whence Fourth Amendment "Seizures"?, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV.

729, 745-53; Tracey Maclin, Justice Marshall: Taking the Fourth Amendment Seriously, 77 CORNELL L. REV.
723, 800-12 (1992).
238. See Bostick, 501 U.S. at 431-32, 437-40.
239. Drayton, 536 U.S. at 197.
240. Id. at 197-99.
241. Id. at 198. As Professor Nadler observed, "the officers had essentially commandeered the bus.
From the passengers' perspective, the message was clear that the bus was going nowhere until the officers were
satisfied that they had received cooperation." Nadler, supranote 14, at 177.
242. Drayton, 536 U.S. at 203-06.
243. Id. at 206-07.
244. Id. at 199.
245. Id. As noted in the text, when Drayton came to the Court, it involved two separate issues-whether
the defendants had been seized and whether their consent was voluntary-which, prior to Drayton, required the
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In a crucial passage, Justice Kennedy explained the Court's current understanding of consent under the Fourth Amendment:
In a society based on law, the concept of agreement and consent should
be given a weight and dignity of its own. Police officers act in full accord
with the law when they ask citizens for consent. It reinforces the rule of
law for the citizen to advise the police of his or her wishes and for the
police to act in reliance on that understanding. When this exchange takes
place, it dispels inferences of coercion. 46
This cryptic passage speaks volumes about the Court's view of consent
searches. Without expressly saying so, Justice Kennedy embraced Bustamonte's
premise that when police request consent to search, the request itself carries the
implication that an alternative of refusal exists. Put another way, when police ask
for consent, citizens understand that they have the right to refuse. And if they do
not want to be searched, it is their responsibility
to know and assert their rights
241
•
and tell the police to leave them alone.
What supports my analysis of this passage? Consider Justice Kennedy's
comments and questions during oral argument in Drayton: First, Kennedy asked
the government's lawyer, Deputy Solicitor General Larry Thompson,
Would it be appropriate in your view for this Court to write an opinion in
which we say that citizens have certain obligations to know their rights
and to assert their rights? That's what makes for a strong democracy ....
And people have a certain obligation to assert their rights. If they don't
want to be searched, they say I don't want to be searched. Should we

write that in an opinion?24
When questioning counsel for the defendants, Kennedy asked, "An American
citizen has to protect his rights once in a while. That's-that's a very bad

consideration of two separate legal standards. To resolve the seizure issue, the applicable legal test asked
whether a reasonable person would have felt free to leave or terminate the encounter with the police. To resolve
the consent issue, Bustamonte's voluntariness test was the applicable legal test. As Professor Nadler explains,
in Drayton the Court implicitly adopted the same "free to refuse/terminate" test for deciding
voluntariness of consent to search that has been used since Bostick for deciding the seizure question.
These two questions-seizure and voluntariness of search-have essentially merged in Bostick and
Drayton. The [Bustamonte] Court's emphasis on balancing order and liberty has receded into the
background. The test is now stated in much more definite terms: free to refuse or terminate.
Nadler, supra note 14, at 162.
246. Drayton, 536 U.S. at 207 (emphasis added).
247. Professor Nadler has read this passage in a slightly different manner. She comments that Drayton
"decided, seemingly as a matter of law, that when a police officer asks a citizen for consent to search, and the
citizen responds positively, such consent is voluntary. 'When this exchange takes place, it dispels inferences of
coercion."' Nadler, supra note 14, at 179 (quoting Drayton, 536 U.S. at 207).
248.

Transcript of Oral Argument at 10, United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002) (No. 01-631).
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thing? '249 After defense counsel responded that requiring the citizen to assert his
rights improperly shifts the burden from the government to prove that the
encounter is consensual and that the consent given is voluntary, Kennedy replied:
The question is whether or not the Government also has the burden to
educate citizens as to their rights in every encounter, whether or not there
isn't some obligation on the part of the citizen to know and to exercise
his rights or her rights.25°
Finally, after complaining about the fact-specific nature of the defendants'
analysis of Fourth Amendment law, Justice Kennedy observed to defense
counsel:
It-it seems to me this world you're creating for us is-is not strong for
the Constitution. It seems to me a strong world is when officers respect
people's rights and-and people know what their rights are and-and
assert their rights. [And say to the police,] I don't want to be
searched.... I don't want to be searched. Leave me alone 5 1
After the oral argument, when it came time to write the opinion in Drayton,
Justice Kennedy concluded that "[i]t reinforces the rule of law" for the police to
ask for consent and "for the citizen to advise the police of his or her wishes. 252
When this exchange occurs, Kennedy held-in what appeared to be a per se
rule-there is no coercion and the consent is valid as a matter of law. 253 It is
constitutionally irrelevant to Justice Kennedy and the rest of the Drayton
majority that the police do not advise citizens of their right to say "no" and never
tell citizens that if they say "no," the police will respect that refusal. Furthermore,
Kennedy's analysis assumes that police will respect a person's refusal to
cooperate in these circumstances, move on to another passenger when they
encounter resistance to their request, and not continue questioning or otherwise
seek to change the person's mind about cooperating with the police. And finally,
Justice Kennedy's analysis also assumes that the typical bus passenger knows
that police will respect and yield to his refusal to cooperate, and that the typical
passenger will not think that unless they cooperate with the police negative
consequences may come their way.
Of course, Justice Kennedy's conclusions regarding the legal expertise and
ability of bus passengers to know and assert their Fourth Amendment rights when
confronted by armed police officers in the narrow confines of a bus are not based
on any empirical data. One could say, as Professor Nadler comments, that
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

Id. at 34.
Id. at 35.
Id. at 44.
Drayton, 536 U.S. at 207.
See Nadler, supra note 14, at 179.
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Kennedy's conclusions are "only intuitive reflections on [his and the other
' 25 4
Justices'] own experience and about the imagined experience of other citizens.
Whether this is true or not, I do not know. But I do agree with Professor Nadler's
general observation that the "unstated concern" in Drayton is "that the police be
permitted to engage in suspicionless seizures and consentless searches so long as
they avoid abusive or overly coercive tactics. 255 In the final analysis, "Drayton is
at bottom based on a judgment about the reasonableness of police conduct under
the circumstances, '256 and there is no reference to, let alone consideration of, "the
[subjective] characteristics of the accused,, 217 as required by Bustamonte's
totality test. Instead, Justice Kennedy explained that the consent was voluntary
because when the officer requested permission to search the defendants' persons,
"he asked first if they objected, thus indicating to a reasonable person that he or
she was free to refuse. 2 8
V. GEORGIA V. RANDOLPH: THE GOOD NEWS ABOUT CONSENT SEARCHES?

This article is entitled, "The Good and Bad News About Consent Searches in
the Supreme Court." So far, my analysis has highlighted the bad aspects of the
Court's consent search jurisprudence-at least from a civil libertarian's
perspective. (From a police perspective, the above discussion must sound pretty
good.) If you have read this far, you may be wondering when I will get to the
good news. That is where Georgia v. Randolph comes in.

254. Id. at 165. My understanding of how people, particularly poor and black, react to a police "request"
was confirmed by a recent article in the New York Times. See Solomon Moore, Reporting While Black, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 30, 2007, § 4. In that article, a black reporter for the New York Times describes what happened to
him while he is talking at midnight with about a dozen other black men on a street in Salisbury, North Carolina.
Three police vehicles appear on the scene. The officers exited their vehicles and the reporter was ordered
toward a tall white officer. Without a question from the officer, or provocation from the men, the reporter's face
is shoved down on a police cruiser and the reporter is handcuffed "so tightly that [his] fingertips tingled." Id.
The police search the reporter's wallet, discover his corporation identification card and learn that there are no
outstanding warrants for the reporter's arrest. Eventually, "the handcuffs were unlocked and [the] wallet
returned without apology or explanation beyond [the police] implication that [someone] approaching young
black men on a public sidewalk was somehow flouting the law." Id. The reporter angrily protested to the police
that "'This is America,"' and informed them that he had "'a right to talk to anyone I like, wherever I like."' Id.
Needless to say, none of those protests persuaded the police that they had done anything illegal or wrong. After
the police left, one of the black men told the reporter: "'Man, you know what would have happened to one of us
if we talked to them that way? . .. We'd be in jail right now."' Id. This man's comment epitomizes my
understanding of why many people cooperate with police "requests"-the fear of police reprisal if they don't. Cf.
Devon W. Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REv. 946, 1014 (2002) (arguing that a
racial minority's refusal to agree to a consent search "can racially aggravate or intensify [a police] encounter,
increasing the person of color's vulnerability to physical v.3lence, arrest, or both").
255. Id. at 163.
256. Id.; see also Simmons, supra note 5,at 780 (explaining that Drayton "applied a purely objective
test").
257. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973).
258. United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 206 (2002) (emphasis added).
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Randolph involved a typical fact scenario: Randolph's wife called the police
during a domestic dispute with her husband.259 When the police arrived, the wife
told them Randolph used cocaine.2 60 Randolph, a lawyer, denied the accusation
but refused to allow the police to search the marital home.26' The police then
asked and obtained permission from the wife to search the home. It goes
without saying that drugs were found and Randolph was charged with drug
possession. The trial court denied Randolph's motion to exclude the drugs, but
the Court of Appeals of Georgia reversed because it found that the search of
Randolph's home violated the Fourth Amendment. 263 The Georgia Supreme
Court affirmed the appellate court's ruling, concluding that "the consent to
conduct a warrantless search of a residence given by one occupant is not valid in
the face of the refusal of another occupant who is physically present at the scene
to permit a warrantless search. 26 4
Counsel for Randolph faced a difficult task when the Court decided to review
his client's case. Every federal appellate court and all but two state courts had
ruled against defendants raising similar Fourth Amendment claims. 265 The reason
why was simple enough. In two previous rulings, the Court held that the Fourth
Amendment permits a warrantless search of a home when police obtain the
consent of an occupant who shares, or is reasonably believed to share, authority
over the premises in common with the target of the search. In the first case, noted
earlier, United States v. Matlock upheld a search of Matlock's bedroom after the
police obtained consent from Matlock's live-in girlfriend while Matlock was
conveniently seated in a police cruiser parked at the curb, handcuffed, and under
arrest. 266 Matlock upheld third-party consent searches on two independent
grounds. One, the third party could authorize the search "in his [or her] own
right., 267 The second basis was that the defendant had "assumed the risk" that a
joint occupant would allow the search.268
The second ruling that posed problems for Randolph was Illinois v.
269
Rodriguez. In Rodriguez, a woman, Gail Fischer, summoned the police to her

259. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 107 (2006).
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. See Randolph v. State, 590 S.E.2d 834 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003).
264. State v. Randolph, 604 S.E.2d 835, 836 (Ga. 2004).
265. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 108-09 n.1. In addition to the Georgia's Supreme Court's holding in
Randolph, only Wisconsin required all present co-occupants' consent for a valid search. See State v. Leach, 782
P.2d 1035, 1040 (Wisc. 1989) (explaining that police may rely upon a third party's consent to search premises;
"[hiowever, should the cohabitant be present and able to object [to the police entry], the police must also obtain
the cohabitant's consent").
266. Id. at 166-67, 169, 179.
267. Id. at 171 n.7.
268. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171 n.7.
269. 497 U.S. 177 (1990).
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mother's home after she claimed that Rodriguez had assaulted her.27 ° Fischer led
the police to Rodriguez's home and opened the door with a key she possessed.27'
Rodriguez was unaware of the police entry because he was upstairs asleep. 72
Police found narcotics inside the home and arrested Rodriguez. It was later
determined that Fischer had not lived in the apartment for several weeks and that
she had no legal authority to consent to an entry.27' That fact did not bother the
Court. Writing for a majority of six Justices that included Justice Kennedy,
Justice Scalia reversed the state court ruling, which had held that the search
violated Rodriguez's Fourth Amendment rights.274
Relying on a "reasonableness" model, Scalia explained that a warrantless
search is valid when based upon the consent of a third party whom the police, at
the time of the entry, reasonably believe possesses common authority over the
premises, but who in fact lacks lawful authority to allow a search. 275 According to
Scalia, the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement does not demand
that the police always be correct in their factual determinations, but rather that
they always be reasonable.276 Thus, Justice Scalia remanded the case to the
Illinois courts to determine whether the officers reasonably believed that Fischer
had the authority to consent to a search of Rodriguez' home.277
When Randolph's case arrived at the Court, the only difference between his
case and Matlock and Rodriguez was that Randolph had denied police consent to
enter. But that fact hardly provided a principled basis to distinguish Matlock and
Rodriguez.
As the deputy solicitor general noted during oral argument, it would be very
odd to say that Matlock relinquished his rights when he was arrested, taken to a
police car, and never asked for consent, or that Rodriguez relinquished his right
by falling asleep in his own home.278

270. Id. at 179.
271. Id. at 179-80.
272. See id.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 180, 189.
275. Id. at 186, 188.
276. Id. at 186.
277. Id. at 189-90.
278. Transcript of Oral Argument at 27-28, Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006) (No. 04-1067):
JUSTICE O'CONNOR: ... If the co-inhabitant is not there, he relinquishes whatever right he had to
object. But if the co-inhabitant is there, and says no, what's the matter with giving effect to that?
MR. DREEBEN: I think it's very odd to say that, in Matlock, the right was relinquished, when
Matlock was arrested and taken to a police car and was never asked for consent, or that Rodriguez
relinquished his right by falling asleep in his own apartment .... [Randolph's argument] would treat
her consent as 100 percent valid when he's asleep or absent, no matter how much we know he would
object, and it would treat it as zero when he's on the scene and vocalizes an objection. And I think
that that would protect Fourth Amendment rights only by happenstance ....
Id.
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Indeed, Justice Souter accurately captured the essence of the government's
claim when he told counsel for Randolph that
[i]t is clear that Matlock, had he known what was going on... would
have objected [to the search]. [Thus], if we accept your argument that the
presence of the person there expressing an objection is what makes the
difference, then Matlock and Rodriguez become almost silly cases. They
are...
cases that rest upon an assumption that is clearly contrary to
279
fact.
When viewed from this perspective, Randolph's claim was based not on a
principled notion of privacy but rather, as Chief Justice Roberts would later
explain in his dissent, on the good luck or happenstance of a homeowner who
just happens to be present and objects to a search when the police arrive. 280
Despite the common sense basis of the government's position, Randolph
earned the magic number in the Supreme Court-five. In a fact-specific ruling,
five justices held that a "warrantless search of a shared dwelling for evidence
over the express refusal of consent by a physically present resident cannot be
justified as reasonable as to him on the basis of consent given to the police by
another resident. '' 2s Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and Thomas
dissented.282 (Justice Alito did not participate in the decision.)
What explains the result in Randolph, particularly in light of the Court's
earlier rulings in Matlock and Rodriguez? First, I think, Justice Souter's opinion
for the Court in Randolph is a determined effort to provide a new mode of
thinking about consent searches. In recent years, Justice Souter has occasionally
shown a willingness to devise new approaches to Fourth Amendment issues and
forgo conventional forms of analysis where he believes that such analysis is
mistaken. For example, in a little noticed dissent in Illinois v. Caballes, Justice
Souter urged the Court to discard its traditional view that a dog-sniff is not a
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 283 Similarly, in his dissent
in Drayton he remarked there was "an air of unreality about the Court's
explanation that bus passengers consent to searches of their luggage to enhance

279. Id. at 46-47.
280. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 137 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("[T]hat the rule is so
random in its application confirms that it bears no real relation to the privacy protected by the Fourth
Amendment. What the majority's rule protects is not so much privacy as the good luck of a co-owner who just
happens to be present at the door when the police arrive.").
281. Id. at 120 (emphasis added).
282. Id. at 127 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); Id. at 142 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Id. at 145 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
283. Illinois v. Cabballes, 543 U.S. 405, 411-14 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe government's use
of a trained narcotics dog functions as a limited search to reveal undisclosed facts about private enclosures, to
be used to justify a further and complete search of the enclosed area. And given the fallibility of the dog, the
sniff is the first step in a process that may disclose 'intimate details' without revealing contraband .... ).
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their own safety and the safety of [other passengers].,, 2 4 And he directly
challenged the legal fiction that bus passengers would reasonably feel free to
ignore or resist police questioning or think that they had nothing to lose if they
refused to cooperate with the police.2

In Randolph, Justice Souter seems to have concluded that "assumption of
risk" theory-which had been the controlling legal model for resolving thirdparty consent search cases-was an unprincipled norm for resolving the difficult
constitutional issues presented in Randolph. As mentioned earlier, when risk
analysis is applied to the facts in Randolph, two pointed issues are left
unanswered. First, "why is it (and when is it) that A's 'own right' to permit a
search must prevail over B's right of privacy in those premises? 28 6 Second, "to
what extent may it truly be said that B's expectation of privacy in a certain place
has been destroyed simply because A enjoys equal property rights in that
place? '287 (Of course, if you resolve these questions in favor of B, a third question
surfaces: If A wants to admit the police, why does B have more of a right to keep
the police out than B has to admit them?)288 For Chief Justice Roberts, these
questions were not difficult: According to the Chief Justice, the Court's
precedents made plain that whenever we share space with another person, we
assume the risk that the other person might consent to a search of the shared
area. 2 9 Justice Souter rejected that answer because it undermined the centuries of
special protection for the privacy of the home.29°
Rather than rely on "assumption of risk" analysis, Justice Souter looked to
what he called "widely shared social expectations, which are naturally enough
influenced by the law of property, but not controlled by its rules. 29 When
common societal expectations were considered, Souter concluded there was no
norm that recognized that a co-occupant has a right or authority to prevail over
the wishes of another occupant who objects to inviting outsiders into their
home.292 Because there is "no common understanding that one co-tenant generally
has a right or authority to prevail over the express wishes of another," the cotenant's decision to allow police access "adds nothing" to the government's side

284. United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 208 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quotations omitted).
285. Id. at 212.
286. LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 8.3(a), at 149.
287. Id.
288. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 36, Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (No. 04-1067).
289. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 128 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("If an individual shares information, papers,
or places with another, he assumes the risk that the other person will in turn share access to that information or
those papers or places with the government. And just as an individual who has shared illegal plans or
incriminating documents with another cannot interpose an objection when that other person turns the
information over to the government, just because the individual happens to be present at the time, so too
someone who shares a place with another cannot interpose an objection when that person decides to grant
access to the police, simply because the objecting individual happens to be present.").
290. Id. at 115 & n.4 (majority opinion).
291. Id. at 11l (citation omitted).
292. Id. at 114.
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of the balancing scale for determining the reasonableness of a police search.293 On
the opposite side is the "centuries-old principle of respect for the privacy of the
home. 294 In the final analysis, Justice Souter concluded that the balancing
process tilted in favor of Randolph because disputed permission for a police entry
is no match against the special protection afforded the privacy of the home.295
Before describing the second, and I believe more interesting, reason for the
result in Randolph, a few things should be said about the majority's opinion.
Although I applaud Justice Souter's determination to find a principled mode of
analysis for analyzing third-party consent searches, I doubt that the social
expectations concept will be applied in a principled manner or will offer
meaningful protection to Fourth Amendment interests in future cases. Fourth
Amendment scholars across the political spectrum agree that the expectations of
privacy model has not generated principled results when it has been used to
determine whether police activity constitutes a search or whether a person has
standing to challenge a search. 296 And although a majority of the Court has not
293. Id. at 114-15.
294. Id. at 115 (quotations and citation omitted).
295. Id. at 115-16 ("Disputed permission is thus no match for [the special protection for the privacy of
the home under] the Fourth Amendment, and the State's other countervailing claims do not add up to outweigh
it."). Justice Souter emphasized that the result in Randolph had "no bearing on the capacity of the police to
protect domestic [violence] victims." Id. at 118. Souter then asserted what appeared to be new legal authority
for the police to enter a private dwelling:
No question has been raised, or reasonably could be, about the authority of the police to enter a
dwelling to protect a resident from domestic violence; so long as they have good reason to believe
such a threat exists, it would be silly to suggest that the police would commit a tort by entering, say,
to give a complaining tenant the opportunity to collect belongings and get out safely, or to determine
whether violence (or threat of violence) has just occurred or is about to (or soon will) occur, however
much a spouse or other co-tenant objected.
Id. (emphasis added). Professor Craig Bradley contends that this statement is a new rule created by the majority
concerning the authority of the police to enter a home to protect the safety of another person. According to
Bradley:
This is a new rule, but a sensible one. The Court has never addressed the issue of what standard of
proof is required to enter a dwelling or other structure to protect an occupant from violence. In
general, exigent circumstance entries, to catch a fleeing felon or to protect evidence from
destruction, require probable cause. But surely the Court is correct to apply the more lenient Terrytype standard of evidence when the police are acting to protect themselves or others, though it
announces this new rule in a very off-handed way.
CRAIG BRADLEY, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: RECENT CASES ANALYZED 82-83 (2007) (citations omitted). Whether
or not Justice Souter intended to announce a new, expansive authority for the police to enter private homes, he
does clearly state that the right of the police to enter a home to protect a domestic violence victim "has nothing
to do with the question in this case, whether a search with the consent of one co-tenant is good against another,
standing at the door and expressly refusing consent." Randolph, 547 U.S. at 119.
296. Legal scholarship criticizing Katz's expectation of privacy test is pervasive. See, e.g., Thomas K.
Clancy, What Does the FourthAmendment Protect: Property, Privacy, or Security?, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
307, 339 (1998) ("[T]he Court's expectation of privacy analysis has many flaws. It has no textual support in the
language of the amendment. It accordingly leaves the fluid concept of privacy to the vagaries of shifting Court
majorities, which are able to manipulate the concept to either expand or contract the meaning of the word at
will." (footnotes omitted)); Morgan Cloud, Pragmatism, Positivism, and Principles in Fourth Amendment
Theory, 41 UCLA L. REv. 199, 252-53 (1993) (stating that the expectations of privacy analysis "has produced
only an amorphous formula that allows the Justices to treat the fourth amendment as an instrument for
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deemed the social expectations concept a failure, one case, Minnesota v.
29
Carter,
' illustrates that expectations theory often produces confusing law and
scant protection for individual privacy.
The central issue in Carter was whether social guests have expectations of
privacy while staying in their host's apartment.9 A majority of the Justices held
that the defendants did not have an expectation of privacy; thus an officer's
viewing of the defendants engaging in illegal
activity through a drawn window
. 299
blind did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion
explained that "an overnight guest in a home may claim the protection of the
Fourth Amendment, but one who is merely present with the consent of the
householder may not."' ° According to the Chief Justice, the defendants in Carter
were

"obviously

somewhere in between"

these

two poles."

Ultimately,

Rehnquist found that the defendants in Carter were not entitled to constitutional
protection because they were present in the home for only a few hours to conduct
a business transaction, they had no previous relationship with the host, and no
facts suggested "a degree of acceptance
into the household" similar to the
30 2
situation involving an overnight guest.
Interestingly, Justice Kennedy, who provided the crucial fifth vote in Carter,
stated that he joined the plurality's opinion because its reasoning was consistent
with his "view that almost all social guests have a legitimate expectation of

achieving social goals approved by shifting majorities on the Court"); Sherry F. Colb, What is a Search? Two
Conceptual Flaws in FourthAmendment Doctrine and Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 119 (2002)
(identifying the two implicit "moves" inherent in the expectations of privacy test); Christopher Slobogin &
Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An
Empirical Look at "Understandings Recognized and Permitted by Society," 42 DUKE L.J. 727, 774 (1993)
(tentative empirical research indicates that the Court's "conclusions about the scope of the Fourth Amendment
are often not in tune with commonly held attitudes about police investigative techniques"). In a recent article,
Professor David Sklansky has observed that "[a]mong scholars Katz is widely viewed as something of a
failure." David Alan Sklansky, "One Train May Hide Another": Katz, Stonewall, and the Secret Subtext of
Criminal Procedure, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 6, on file with the McGeorge
Law Review); see also Clancy, supra, at 339 n.234 (listing legal scholarship criticizing Katz). Professor
Sklansky best summarizes the failure of the expectations of privacy concept:
At best, the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test has seemed fraudulent-a flashy, modemsounding way to dress up results that are really driven by the property-based reasoning set forth in
Olmstead [v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928)] and nominally rejected in Katz. At worst, Katz
traded the relatively firm footholds of the Olmstead test for a loosey-goosey, unreliable focus on
expectations of privacy that "society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."' Indeed to many
observers, on and off the Court, the Katz test has come to seem wholly circular: an expectation of
privacy is reasonable if the Court is willing to protect it.
Sklansky, supra, at 6 (footnotes omitted).
297. 525 U.S. 83 (1998). Speaking for himself and Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia has reached this
conclusion. See id. at 97 (Scalia, J., concurring) (calling the expectations of privacy rule a "self-indulgent test"
that has "no plausible foundation in the text of the Fourth Amendment").
298. See id. at 83 (majority opinion).
299. Id. at85,91.
300. Id. at 90.
301. id. at 91.
302. Id. at 90-91.
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privacy."3 °3 Yet there was nothing in the Chief Justice's opinion supporting the
claim that "almost all social guests" have a legitimate expectation of privacy
while in the home of a third party. Furthermore, Kennedy also asserted that
Justice Ginsburg's dissent "must be correct that reasonable expectations of the
owner are shared, to some extent, by the guest," which meant, according to
Kennedy, that, "as a general rule, social guests will have an expectation of
privacy in their host's home."3°4 Notwithstanding these statements, Kennedy
concluded that the defendants in Carter were not entitled to constitutional
protection. 3°5 Unfortunately, neither Justice Kennedy's concurrence nor any of the
other opinions in Carter explain what facts a social guest or visitor must prove to
show that he is entitled to Fourth Amendment protection when in the home of his
host.
If the result and reasoning of Carter is an indication of the how the Court
will apply social expectations theory to future third-party consent search cases,
we should not expect principled results. Randolph's holding will probably be
confined to its unique facts, and in future cases the Court will rule that the social
expectations that protected Randolph's home will not protect his car or luggage.
Already, there is evidence that the Randolph majority is uncomfortable with
Randolph's alignment with prior cases. The Court admits that it is "drawing a
fine line" between the result in Randolph and the results in Matlock and
Rodriguez but insists that the "formalism is justified."3 6 But why is the formalism
justified? The fine line drawing and formalism cannot be justified because of "the
centuries of special protection for the privacy of the home."3 7 Weren't the homes
of Matlock and Rodriguez also entitled to "the centuries of special protection for
the privacy of the home?" The fine line drawing and formalism cannot be
justified to provide clarity for the police. Wasn't there an easily administered rule
available for Matlock and Rodriguez? Justice Souter suggested one during oral
argument: "the only consent that will suffice will be the consent of the person
against whom you expect to use any evidence found., 30 ' As Souter observed, this

303. Id. at 99 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
304. Id. at 101-02.
305. Justice Kennedy explained that the defendants had a "fleeting and insubstantial connection" to the
host's home because they used the home simply as a convenient processing station, there was no evidence that
they had engaged in confidential communications with the host or had been at the home previously, they left
before their arrest, and the lower court had found that they could not be characterized as the host's "guests." Id.
at 102.
306. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 121 (2006).
307. See id. at 115 n.4.
308. Transcript of Oral Argument, at 47-48, Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006) (No. 04-1067).
Of course, another easily administered rule could have been applied in Matlock and Rodriguez, namely, because
the police lacked a search warrant and because there were no exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless
entry, the search was illegal because the consent of a third party provides a "wholly inadequate substitute for the
protections which inhere in a judicially granted warrant." United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 187 (1974)
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
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too is an "[e]asy clear line." 3°9 Finally, if the formalism is justified only because
Randolph was present and objected to the search, then Chief Justice Roberts is
right to criticize the result in Randolph as unprincipled.1
In light of these considerations, Randolph's protection will probably extend
only to the few individuals lucky enough to be present when the police arrive at
their homes and knowledgeable enough to refuse when police seek permission to
enter their homes."' Of course, police officers will also know how to evade
Randolph's protections. In a post-Randolph world, an absent suspect's refusal to
give consent will not be the final word when the police can obtain the consent of
the suspect's co-occupant." 2 And if necessary, the police can always remove or

309. Transcript of Oral Argument at 48, Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006) (No. 04-1067).
310. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 136-37 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("What the majority's rule protects is not
so much privacy as the good luck of a co-owner who just happens to be present at the door when the police
arrive.... We should not embrace a rule at the outset that its sponsors appreciate will result in drawing fine,
formalistic lines."). Professor LaFave rightly notes that the dissenters' criticism "loses some of its bite when it
is considered that those dissenters were not arguing for a broader rule, but rather for no rule at all beyond that in
Matlock." LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 8.3, at 20 (Supp. 2007).
311. Some academic commentators see Randolph as an extremely narrow holding. See, e.g., BRADLEY,
supra note 295, at 81 (explaining that the Randolph majority "went out of its way to stress the narrowness of its
opinion" and Justice Breyer repeated those points in his concurrence); David A. Moran, The End of the
Exclusionary Rule, Among Other Things: The Roberts Court Takes on the FourthAmendment, 2006 CATO SuP.
CT. REv. 283, 291-93 (noting that Randolph is "far too fact-bound and narrow to count as a truly important
Fourth Amendment case" and will apply to "only a tiny handful of cases every year"); Andrew Fiske, DisputedConsent Searches: An UncharacteristicStep Toward Reinforcing Defendants' Privacy Rights, 84 DENV. U. L.
REv. 721, 736 (2006) (same). Similarly, some courts see Randolph's holding as narrow. See, e.g., Donald v.
State, 903 A.2d 315 (Del. 2006). In Donald,police arrested the defendant's boyfriend whose probation required
that he summit to warrantless searches of his home. Id. at 317-18. Police then went to the home shared by
defendant and her boyfriend and announced they were conducting an administrative search of the home. Id. at
318. The defendant did not object to the search, which revealed illegal narcotics and drug paraphernalia. Id. The
Delaware Supreme Court upheld the search and explained that Randolph supported its ruling. According to the
court, under Randolph, "police are not required to take affirmative steps to seek consent from a potentially
objecting co-tenant, even when present." Id. at 321. Here, the defendant "could have prevented the search of her
home without a warrant by expressly objecting to it," but "[s]he did not." Id.
Notwithstanding cases like Donald,Professor Burkoff believes that Randolph's social expectation theory
has a greater potential to impact consent search law. See Burkoff, supra note 5, at 1131-32, 1135-40. According
to Professor Burkoff, Randolph's logic extends beyond third-party consent searches and even overrules
Bustamonte's conclusion that the community's generalized interest in effective law enforcement outweighs the
individual's interest in being informed of his right to refuse a police request for a consent search. See id at 1139.
Specifically, Burkoff states that "although the [Bustamonte] majority expressly held to the contrary, it would
appear [after Randolph] that, at the very least, our shared social expectations would be-our common sense
would tell us-that one needs to be aware of the existence of the important constitutional right not to accede to
a request to be searched by a police officer before one can surrender it." Id. While I certainly agree with
Professor Burkoff's view that common sense dictates that most people need to be informed of their right to
refuse a police request for a consent search to be deemed constitutional, for the reasons stated in the text of this
article, I doubt that Randolph's social expectations concept will mandate a change in the law of consent
searches.
312. See, e.g., United States v. Reed, No. 3:06-CR-75 RM, 2006 WL 2252515, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 3,
2006) (stating that, although defendant refused to provide consent to search his residence while under arrest at
the police station, police went to his home and obtained consent to search the home from his girlfriend who
lived with the defendant). The search of the home was valid under Randolph because the defendant "wasn't
present at the house to deny the police permission to enter." Id. at *10. One commentator disagrees with this
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arrest a suspect before seeking the co-occupant's consent. To be sure, Justice
Souter indicated that efforts to avoid Randolph's holding might invalidate an
otherwise proper third-party consent if there is "evidence that the police have
removed the potentially objecting tenant from the entrance for the sake of
avoiding a possible objection."3 3 But even this exception provides marginal

security to someone who would object to a police search of his home. The
protection granted in this exception "does not cover a case like Matlock, where
the potential objector was removed from the premises but not 'from the
entrance.' 3,1 4 The nuance in this caveat will escape most police officers, and,
perhaps, a few judges. Finally, even if a judge is willing to consider the motives
behind a police decision to remove a suspect from the scene (of course, cases like
Whren v. United States3 5 instruct judges that the subjective motivations of the
police are rarely relevant to Fourth Amendment issues), the judge will then be
confronted with a series of questions that are likely to be resolved in favor of the
police.3 6

The above analysis suggests that the good news that Randolph proclaims
about third-party consent searches is not likely to last very long. At the same
time, there is another feature of Randolph that may prove more enduring than the
social expectations concept that provides the nominal foundation for the ruling.
The second, and more important, explanation for the result in Randolph is Justice
Kennedy's vote. At first glance, Kennedy's decision to join Justice Souter's
opinion is perplexing. After all, Kennedy joined the Rodriguez majority,
approving a third-party consent search in a context where the third party lacked
the legal authority to allow a search. By contrast, in Randolph, the wife clearly

narrow reading of Randolph. See Renee E. Williams, Note, Third Party Consent Searches After Georgia v.
Randolph: Dueling Approaches to the Dueling Roommates, 87 B.U. L. REV. 937 (2007). Indeed, this
commentator, like Professor Burkoff, believes that Randolph "signal[s] a potential change in the direction of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in favor of giving more protection to defendants' privacy rights." Id.at 952.
In a thoughtful analysis of Randolph and the lower court cases decided in its wake, Williams contends:
Matlock, Rodriguez, and Randolph can all be reconciled under [the social expectations] principle, as
it simply can not be objectively reasonable under any societal understanding to enter shared premises
based on the consent of one co-occupant when the police officer knows that another co-occupant has
expressly refused to give consent. The physical presence of the objecting co-occupant has no
substantial bearing on the interests that the social expectations test is meant to protect, and thus the
broad view of Randolph represents the correct approach to the dueling roommate situation."
Id. at 967-68.
313. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 121.
314. LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 8.3, at 20 (Supp. 2007) (emphasis added).
315. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
316. For example, Randolph is critical of removing the suspect "for the sake of avoiding a possible
objection," Randolph, 547 U.S. at 121, which suggests that removing or arresting the suspect for questioning or
some other reason like safety, or simply arresting and removing the suspect because the police have probable
cause, is permissible and does not invalidate a subsequent consent provided by a third party. Furthermore, even
in cases where the defendant proves he was removed "for the sake of avoiding a possible objection," a judge
must still decide whether the bad-faith of the police "automatically nullif[ies] the consent of the third party, or
must some judgment [be] made about whether the removed defendant would otherwise have objected" to the
subsequent search. LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 8.3, at 21 (Supp. 2007).
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possessed the legal right to authorize a police entry into the marital home. And
when the reasonableness model announced in Rodriguez is applied to the facts in
Randolph, it is obvious that the police acted properly (and "reasonably") when
they relied upon the wife's authority to enter the home. Moreover, and generally
speaking, Justice Kennedy has not been a strong advocate for Fourth Amendment
rights. Even in cases where Kennedy ends up agreeing with arguments proposed
37
by the defense, as he did in Minnesota v. Carter,
Justice Kennedy usually finds

a way to vote in favor of the government, as he also did in Carter.
'8
In any event, Kennedy's vote in Randolph was extremely important.
Kennedy provided the fifth, and probably decisive, vote by joining the so-called
"liberal" justices. Had he voted with the conservative justices, as he normally
does, the Court would have split 4-4. Or, had he joined the conservatives, he
might have convinced Justice Breyer to go along with him to form a majority
voting for the government, as occurred in Drayton, where Breyer abandoned the
liberals and voted with the conservatives to rule that the defendants had validly
consented to the searches in that case.

319

I suspect that agreement with Justice Souter's social expectations concept
was not the motivating force behind Justice Kennedy's vote in Randolph. The
basis for Kennedy's vote, although unacknowledged, is more clear-cut. Recall
Justice Kennedy's comments during the oral argument in Drayton. There, he
emphasized that "citizens have certain obligations to know their rights and to
asserttheir rights ....

That's what makes for a strong democracy. The law lives

in the consciousness of the people. And people have a certain obligation to assert
their rights., 320 And recall Kennedy's other remark that "It seems to me a strong
world is when officers respect people's rights and-and people know what their

317. See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 99-103 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
318. In the October Term 2005, the Term in which Randolph was decided, Justice Kennedy was in the
majority on nine of the twelve 5-4 split decisions. See Statisticsfor the Supreme Court'sOctober Term 2005, 75
U.S.L.WK. 3029, 3029 (July 18, 2006). The importance of Justice Kennedy's vote in 5-4 rulings was more
evident in the next Term. See Statistics for the Supreme Court's October Term 2006, 76 U.S.L.WK. 3052, 3052
(Aug. 7, 2007) (reporting that in the October Term 2006, Justice Kennedy "voted with the majority in all 24 of
the Court's 5-4 decisions").
319. A close reading of Justice Breyer's concurrence in Randolph and the content of his questions
during oral argument suggest that his vote for Randolph was, at best, a cautious one, and that he could have
been persuaded to join the conservative Justices to vote for the state. See Randolph, 547 U.S. at 125 (Breyer, J.,
concurring) ("If Fourth Amendment law forced us to choose between two bright-line rules, (1) a rule that
always found one tenant's consent sufficient to justify a search without a warrant and (2) a rule that never did, I
believe we should choose the first. That is because, as THE CHIEF JUSTICE'S dissent points out, a rule
permitting such searches can serve important law enforcement needs (for example, in domestic abuse cases),
and the consenting party's joint tenancy diminishes the objecting party's reasonable expectation of privacy.");
see also id. at 126 ("I stress the totality of the circumstances, however, because, were the circumstances to
change significantly, so should the result. The Court's opinion does not apply where the objector is not present
'and object[ing]."').
320. Transcript of Oral Argument at 10, United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (No. 01-631) (emphasis
added).
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rights are and-and assert their rights [and say to the police] I don't want to be
searched.... I don't want to be searched. Leave me alone. 32'
Well, Randolph not only knew his rights, he expressly asserted his rights by
refusing police access to his home. Moreover, the police did not respect his
assertion. Instead, they ignored Randolph's refusal and gained access to his home
by obtaining consent from his wife. These facts, I believe, were determinative for
Justice Kennedy and explain his vote in Randolph, notwithstanding his previous
decision to join the Rodriguez majority. To be sure, Justice Kennedy does not
provide any evidence in the form of a concurring opinion to support my thesis,
and his questions during oral argument in Randolph did not pursue this line of
reasoning. Nevertheless, the tone and logic of his questions during the oral
arguments in Drayton and his opinion in that case, which emphasized that "It
reinforces the rule of law for the citizen to advise the police of his or her wishes
andfor the police to act in reliance on that understanding. 322 Both suggest that an
individual's assertion of his rights is extremely important to Justice Kennedy's
conception of the scope of the Fourth Amendment's protection regarding consent
searches. Otherwise, Justice Kennedy's vote in Randolph is difficult to reconcile
with his vote in Rodriguez.
VI. RANDOLPH'S IMPACT ON FUTURE CONSENT CASES

Section I of this article began by suggesting that Randolph might signal an
important change in the Court's consent search doctrine. The new approach that
Randolph may initiate, however, is unlikely to be instigated by Justice Souter's
adoption of the social expectations test. Rather, any change in the law of consent
searches prompted by Randolph is likely to reflect Justice Kennedy's concerns
about citizens asserting their Fourth Amendment rights and police respecting
those assertions. But before describing how Justice Kennedy's concerns can be
applied to future cases, I need to explain why my proposal is so modest
notwithstanding all of the troublesome aspects of consent searches described in
this article.
First, there are strong arguments supporting banning consent searches
completely. Professor Marcy Strauss has taken this position, and I concur with
her conclusions that, generally speaking, consent searches are not an effective
law enforcement technique and that most consent searches are corrosive of
Fourth Amendment rights 3 I also agree with the judgment of Professor Christo
Lassiter that the notion of motorists voluntarily consenting to searches of their
vehicles after being subject to police interrogation during a traffic stop is a legal
fiction that ought to be eliminated.'24 Strategically speaking, however, the current
321.
322.
323.
324.

Id. at 44 (emphasis added).
Drayton, 536 U.S. at 207.
See Strauss, supra note 4, at 258-72.
See Lassiter, supra note 5. I also agree with Professor George Thomas' observations that the
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Court will never ban consent searches. Thus, although I agree with many of
Professor Strauss' and Professor Lassiter's conclusions, their proposals to ban
consent searches are not-at this point in time-a strategic solution to the
problems associated with consent searches.
Second, requiring warnings and a statement that police will respect and
comply with a person's refusal to allow a consent search would help alleviate
some of the coercive aspects of consent searches. But, as with an outright ban,
the current Court will not interpret the Fourth Amendment to require warnings no
matter what empirical evidence reveals about an individual's perceptions and
ability to assert his rights during police-citizen encounters. When I refer to
empirical evidence, I have in mind the data on consent searches presented in Illya
Licentenberg's dissertation. 125 For example, his empirical research revealed that
motorists in Ohio consent to searches of their automobiles during traffic stops
"for one primary reason: fear of reprisal if they refused. 3 26 His data also revealed
'
that motorists were "unaware of their legal right to refuse,"327
believed that

"refusals [to allow searches] are futile,"3 28 "fear[ed] police reprisal or added
inconvenience from a refusal, 329 and "[a]lmost none of the subjects [surveyed]
felt that the officer would honor their decision to refuse. 330 In other words, most
motorists 33believed that "the search [would] be conducted with or without their
consent.,

'

Instead of banning consent searches or calling for Miranda-like warnings,
both of which would be beneficial, my suggestion is a more modest proposal that
is consistent with Justice Kennedy's tacit concerns in Randolph and Drayton.
Under current Fourth Amendment law, if a person is asked by the police to
provide consent, but refuses, the voluntariness test of Bustamonte does not
prevent the police from continuing to seek consent.3 32 To be sure, an earlier
refusal is a factor that is sometimes considered by the courts,3 33 but it does not

trigger a per se rule against continued requests for consent. Similarly, a person's
Court's consent search doctrine "is an acid that has eaten away the Fourth Amendment," Thomas, supra note 8,
at 541, and that it is "coherent, if not inevitable, to conclude that searches produced largely by acquiescence to
police authority are simply not reasonable searches." Id. at 549. Accordingly, Professor Thomas has proposed
that "outside the context of public safety requests for consent, the Fourth Amendment should be interpreted so
that a search based solely on consent is not a reasonable search. In effect ....
consent should be ignored as a
basis for a search except when it protects the public safety." Id. at 557.
325. See Lichtenberg, supra note 6.
326. Id. at 250.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 275.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. See LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 8.2(0, at 97 ("It would appear that under the voluntariness test there
is no absolute bar upon continuing to seek consent in the face of the prior refusal.").
333. Id. § 8.2(0, at 98 ("[I]t would seem that the suspect's earlier refusal to give consent is a factor
which is properly taken into account as a part of the 'totality of the circumstances' in judging the later consent
under the [Bustamonte] formula.").
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subsequent refusal to sign a consent form does not operate to make a priororal
consent invalid.33 More importantly, many courts have upheld consent searches
in contexts where a person initially refuses and the police then indicate that he
will obtain a warrant to authorize a search or explain that other types of police
procedures will ensue-such as arresting or detaining the person because of his
refusal.335 Put differently, existing law on consent searches "does not preclude the
police from trying to 'persuade' the suspect to consent. 33 6 Not only are the police
not required to take "no" as the final answer, but current law "does not preclude
the police from 'wearing down' the suspect to obtain consent.
I propose that whenever a person objects or refuses to provide consent, as
Randolph did, that refusal should bar further attempts by the police to seek
consent. Furthermore, a refusal to sign a written consent form should also operate
retroactively to invalidate an earlier oral consent. If the person says no or refuses
to sign a written consent form, then, as a matter of Fourth Amendment law,
police should be barred from continuing to seek permission to search or
explaining that alternative police procedures will ensue as result of the person's
assertion of his rights.338 In other words, my proposal is similar to the rule that
already applies in the police interrogation context under Miranda and its
progeny. Whenever a suspect asks to speak with a lawyer, under Edwards v.
Arizona, the police are barred from further questioning until counsel has been

334. Id. § 8.2(f), at 99 ("The claim that the subsequent refusal to sign a consent form operates to make
the prior oral consent a nullity has been rather summarily rejected by the courts, as has the broader claim that a
written consent is essential to establishment of a valid consensual search." (footnotes omitted)).
335. See, e.g., State v. Livingston, 897 A.2d 977, 984 (N.H. 2006) (finding the defendant's consent to
search his car voluntary). Defendant's initial refusal to allow the search
was accompanied by a statement indicating that he thought that he had no other options available to
him. [The officer] informed the defendant that he could continue to refuse to consent to a search of
the vehicle as well as explained the alternative procedures that would ensue should the defendant
choose to do so. Therefore, in response to his own inquiry, the defendant was informed that his
refusal to consent to a search of his vehicle would result in a canine sniff search of the vehicle's
exterior, which, if positive, would lead to [the officer] applying for a warrant to search the vehicle.
Id.; State v. Watkins, 610 S.E.2d 746, 751 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) (concluding that the defendant's girlfriend's
consent to search the defendant's shed located near the defendant's home was voluntary). Although the
girlfriend initially refused to consent, she gave the police "a key to the shed after they told her they would get a
warrant and tear down the door." Watkins, 610 S.E.2d. at 750.
336. Strauss, supra note 4, at 250-51.
337. Id. at 251.
338. Professor Steven L. Chanenson has previously urged a similar rule, as a matter of police policy,
rather than as a constitutional requirement, against police efforts to obtain consent after a person has refused.
Steven L. Chanenson, Get the Facts Jack! EmpiricalResearch and the Changing Constitutional Landscape of
Consent Searches, 71 TENN. L. REv. 399, 468 (2004) (arguing that "repeated questioning and pressure presents
a troubling problem" and that "police departments should prohibit repeated requests for consent to search after
the citizen has refused"). Although Professor Chanenson does not propose the adoption of any per se rules when
citizens refuse a consent search, see id. ("Consistent with the courts' treatment of invocations of the right to
silence in the custodial interrogation context, the police could ask for consent again, but typically not for several
hours."), he does acknowledge that "in stereotypical traffic stops, saying 'no' would mean 'no' forever because
the motorist will drive away." Id.
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provided unless the suspect eviunces a desire to discuss the investigation.339 The
per se rule announced in Edwards was designed to end police badgering, provide
guidance to the police, and, most importantly, help suspects who feel
uncomfortable dealing with police interrogation by themselves.
A similar per se rule for persons who refuse to allow a consent search would
also discourage police badgering of persons, provide guidance to lower courts
and police officers who must apply and comply with Bustamonte's open-ended
voluntariness test or the reasonableness rule announced in Drayton, and, most
importantly, protect the Fourth Amendment rights of persons who are
uncomfortable dealing with police-citizen encounters and who believe that police
officers will not honor their refusal to allow consent searches. As a practical
matter, this proposal is also consistent with the legal theory that appears to be
motivating Justice Kennedy's thinking on consent searches, namely that people
should know their rights and assert them if they do not want police invading their
privacy. Thus, if a motorist refuses to allow a consent search during a traffic stop,
that objection should end the matter, just as Randolph's refusal was the
determining factor in his case. The police should not be allowed to continue
seeking consent, or tell the motorist that a drug-sniffing canine will be brought to
the scene, or that his or her car will be impounded, or that the police will seek a
search warrant. These tactics are designed to undermine the person's initial
assertion of his rights. Put succinctly, knowing and asserting your rights should
have real and important legal consequences, just as it did in Randolph.
VII. CONCLUSION
When Bustamonte was decided, Justice Marshall complained that the Court
had approved "a game of blindman's buff [sic], in which the police always have
the upper hand, for the sake of nothing more than the convenience of the
police."3' 40 Justice Marshall's concerns were validated when a police detective
explained to researchers how obtaining a person's consent to search simply
involved making an offer that could not be refused:
[You] tell the guy, "Let me come in and take a look at your house." And
he says, "No, I don't want to." And then you tell him, "Then, I'm going
to leave Sam here, and he's going to live with you until we come back
[with a search warrant]. Now we can do it either way." And very rarely
do the people say, "Go get your search warrant, then."' '

339. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981) ("[A]n [arrestee] having expressed his desire to
deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel
has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or
conversations with the police.").
340. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 289-90 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
341. VAN DUIZEND, SUTrON & CARTER, supra note 16, at 69.
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This anecdote nicely captures how consent occurs in the real world. It also
exposes the fictional quality of the Court's consent search doctrine. Perhaps
Randolph signals a change in the law. Undoubtedly, Randolph and Drayton make
plain that if people do not want their homes, persons, or belongings searched,
they must stand up against the police and assert their rights. I would take these
cases one step further: When a person asserts his or her rights and says "no" to
the police, the game should be over and police should not be permitted to bluff or
coax consent from a person. That is the essence of Justice Kennedy's opinion in
Drayton and that view explains his vote in Randolph.

